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ABSTRACT 
This doctoral dissertation explores how populist radical right politicians in 
Finland and Sweden use political blogs for the purpose of nationalist political 
communication and persuasion. The study builds upon research that has 
highlighted the growing importance of social media in the transmission of 
radical right, nationalist and anti-immigration political discourse, and to the 
central role of these media in the gradual normalisation of such discourse. 
Moreover, the study acknowledges the potential – indicated by previous 
research – of political blogs to function as tools for voter persuasion and 
mobilisation. The study aims to contribute with insights on how social 
psychological dynamics such as self-presentation, identity-constructions, 
discursive divisions between ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’, strategies of 
persuasion, and appeals to emotions and nostalgic memories are involved in 
these processes. 
The dissertation examines blog-entries by members of the populist radical 
right parties the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) in Finland and the Sweden 
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) in Sweden during 2007-2015. The 
bloggers who are the focus of the study represent, first, the parties’ extreme 
anti-immigration factions, comprised first and foremost of white men (Studies 
I and IV); second, the parties’ women’s leagues (Study II); and third, 
politicians with immigrant or other ethnic minority background who have 
chosen to join a populist radical right party (Study III). The critical discursive 
and rhetorical psychological study explores the nationalist political blog 
discourse at three levels: it investigates the arguments it contains; by what 
verbal, visual and digital means these arguments are presented in order to 
seem convincing; and what implications these formulations might have in a 
social and political sense. In so doing, the study approaches the political blog-
discourse as part and parcel of its broader argumentative context.  
This dissertation contributes to social psychological research on nationalist 
political communication and persuasion in three central ways. First, by 
delving into the discourse of both white men, women and ethnic minority 
members in populist radical right parties, it provides an understanding of the 
diversity of voices within such parties. Women and immigrants within these 
parties seem to be faced with particular dilemmas: the former ones with that 
between societal norms of gender equality and the patriarchal politics of the 
populist radical right; and the latter ones with that of being an immigrant in 
an anti-immigration political party. The critical discursive and rhetorical 
analyses of this study are able to show how these politicians strive to reconcile 
such dilemmas in their blog-discourse in ways that nevertheless remain 
faithful to the promotion of patriarchal and nationalist political causes.  
Second, this dissertation extends the critical discursive and rhetorical 
approach with analytical tools from narrative psychology, social semiotic 
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studies of images and studies of online political communication. Thus moving 
‘beyond the text’ in its analytical approach, the study is able to explore the 
multitude of (audio-)visual, digital and communicative features contained in 
political blogs, and how these interact with ‘classical’ rhetorical strategies, 
narrative structures, and socially and culturally rooted discursive resources in 
the construction of nationalist political arguments.  
Third, the study shows that the (audio-)visual, digital and communicative 
features of the blogs allow for the presentation of socially sensitive and even 
racist political views without the individual blogger having to express an 
explicit personal opinion on the matter at hand. Because of these features 
political blogs seem to constitute an optimal sphere for nationalist political 
communication and persuasion: they enable the conveying of powerful, 
credible and emotion-provoking messages, yet they concomitantly protect the 
blogger from charges of holding racist views.  
Discourse contained in political blogs does not remain in the blogosphere, 
but becomes circulated in mainstream media and thus influences the broader 
societal and political debate. In order to grasp the character and societal 
implications of contemporary political communication and persuasion, this 
dissertation thus encourages social psychological research to develop its tools 
for critically studying discourse contained in political blogs.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan suomalaisten ja ruotsalaisten 
oikeistopopulististen poliitikoiden kansallismielisiä ja äänestäjien 
suostutteluun pyrkiviä poliittisia blogikirjoituksia. Väitöskirjan lähtökohtana 
on aiempi tutkimus, jonka mukaan sosiaalinen media – blogit mukaan lukien 
– ovat yhä tärkeämpi väline äärioikeistolaisen, kansallismielisen ja 
muukalaisvastaisen poliittisen diskurssin levittämiselle ja tällaisen puheen 
vähittäiselle yhteiskunnalliselle normalisoitumiselle.  
Tutkimus lähestyy poliittisia blogeja äänestäjien suostuttelun ja 
mobilisoinnin välineinä. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on valottaa 
sosiaalipsykologisten ilmiöiden – kuten identiteettikategorioiden 
rakentumista ja käyttöä, sisä-ulkoryhmäjakoja, ja jaettuihin käsityksiin, 
tunteisiin ja nostalgisiin muistoihin pohjaavia suostuttelukeinoja – osaa 
äänestäjien suostuttelussa ja mobilisoinnissa. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan 
Perussuomalaisten ja Ruotsidemokraattien jäsenten blogikirjoituksia 
ajanjaksolla 2007-2015. Tutkimuksen keskiössä olevat poliitikot edustavat 
puolueiden muukalaisvastaisia siipiä (Osatutkimus I ja IV), naisjärjestöjä 
(Osatutkimus II) ja Ruotsidemokraattien maahanmuuttotaustaisia tai 
etniseen vähemmistöön kuuluvia poliitikkoja (Osatutkimus III). 
Kriittisen diskursiivisen ja retorisen psykologian lähestymistapoja 
hyödyntäen tutkimus lähestyy poliittista diskurssia osana sen 
argumentatiivista ympäristöä. Näin ollen tutkimus tarkastelee 
kansallismielistä poliittista blogidiskurssia kolmella tasolla: sisällön (1), 
retorisen – sekä verbaalisen, digitaalisen, visuaalisen että viestinnällisen – 
muodon (2), sekä mahdollisten sosiaalisten ja poliittisten seuraamusten (3) 
tasoilla.  
Tutkimus edistää kansallismielisen poliittisen viestinnän ja suostuttelun 
sosiaalipsykologista tutkimusta kolmella tavalla. Ensinnäkin, se valottaa 
kansallismielisten puolueiden äänten monimuotoisuutta tarkastelemalla 
”valkoisten” miesten lisäksi oikeistopopulistisiin puolueisiin kuuluvien 
naisten ja maahanmuuttajien sekä etniseen vähemmistöön kuuluvien 
poliitikkojen diskurssia.  Erityisesti naisten ja maahanmuuttajien tai etnisten 
vähemmistöjen edustajien voi ajatella olevan dilemmaattisessa suhteessa 
oikeistopopulistiseen puolueeseensa nähden: naiset joutuvat 
tasapainottelemaan toisaalta yhteiskunnallisten tasa-arvonormien ja toisaalta 
puolueensa patriarkaalisen politiikan välillä; maahanmuuttajat ja etniset 
vähemmistöjäsenet taas joutuvat suhteuttamaan etnisen ja poliittisen 
identiteettinsä toisiinsa. Väitöstutkimus ilmentää niitä tapoja, joilla 
naispoliitikot sekä maahanmuuttotaustaiset tai etniseen vähemmistöön 
kuuluvat poliitikot pyrkivät ratkaisemaan näitä dilemmoja 
blogidiskurseissaan tavalla, joka kuitenkin ajaa patriarkaalisen ja 
kansallismielisen politiikan asiaa. 
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Toiseksi, tutkimus laajentaa kriittisen diskursiivisen sekä retorisen 
psykologian lähestymistapaa narratiivisen psykologian, visuaalisen 
sosiaalisen semiotiikan sekä poliittisen verkkoviestinnän tutkimuksen 
työkaluilla. Väitöstutkimuksessa tarkastellaan myös “tekstin” ulkopuolisia 
elementtejä eli sitä, miten (audio-)visuaaliset, digitaaliset ja 
kommunikatiiviset elementit yhdessä klassisten retoristen strategioiden, 
narratiivisten rakenteiden ja sosiaalisesti ja kulttuurisesti jaettujen resurssien 
kanssa osallistuvat blogien sisältämän monikerroksisen kansallismielisen 
diskurssin tuottamiseen.  
Kolmanneksi, tutkimus osoittaa, että blogien (audio)visuaaliset, 
digitaaliset ja kommunikatiiviset ominaisuudet mahdollistavat sosiaalisesti 
arkaluontoisten ja jopa rasististen (poliittisten) näkemysten ilmaisun – ilman, 
että poliitikon tarvitsee itse kertoa omaa henkilökohtaista kantaansa kyseiseen 
aiheeseen. Näiden ominaisuuksien ansiosta poliittiset blogit muodostavat 
ihanteellisen ympäristön kansallismieliselle poliittiselle viestinnälle ja 
suostuttelulle: ne mahdollistavat voimakkaiden, uskottavien ja tunteisiin 
vetoavien viestien välittämisen, mutta samalla kuitenkin suojelevat bloggaajaa 
rasismisyytöksistä.  
Blogien sisältämä kansallismielinen poliittinen diskurssi ei jää blogeihin, 
vaan sitä kierrätetään valtamediassa ja näin ollen se vaikuttaa laajempaan 
yhteiskunnalliseen ja poliittiseen keskusteluun. Jotta voisimme 
asianmukaisesti tutkia nykyistä kansallismielistä poliittista kommunikaatiota 
ja suostuttelua, ja niiden yhteiskunnallisia seurauksia, kannustaa tämä 
väitöstutkimus sosiaalipsykologian tieteenalaa kehittämään välineitä blogien 
poliittisen diskurssin kriittiseen analyysiin. 
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ABSTRAKT 
I denna doktorsavhandling undersöks hur högerpopulistiska politiker i 
Finland och Sverige använder politiska bloggar för att nå ut till potentiella 
väljare med nationalistiska budskap. Avhandlingen bygger på tidigare 
forskning som påvisat sociala mediers betydelse för spridningen och den 
gradvisa normaliseringen av högerextremistisk, nationalistisk och 
invandringsfientlig politisk diskurs, samt bloggars funktion som verktyg för 
övertalning och mobilisering av väljare. Avhandlingen söker bidra med 
insikter om hur socialpsykologiska fenomen såsom identitetskonstruktioner 
och deras användning, uppdelningar i in- och utgrupper, samt 
övertalningsstrategier som vädjar till känslor, nostalgiska minnen och ”sunt 
förnuft” är inbegripna i övertalningen och mobiliseringen av väljare. 
I avhandlingen undersöks Sannfinländarnas och Sverigedemokraternas 
medlemmars bloggtexter mellan åren 2007 och 2015. Politikerna vars diskurs 
undersöks tillhör, för det första, medlemmar av respektive partiers 
invandringsfientliga falanger (Studier I och IV); för det andra, partiernas 
kvinnoförbund (Studie II); och för det tredje, Sverigedemokrater som har 
invandrarbakgrund eller tillhör en etnisk minoritet (Studie III). Dessa olika 
politikers bloggdiskurs undersöks ur ett kritiskt diskursivt och retoriskt 
psykologiskt perspektiv, vilket betyder att forskningen tar i beaktande det 
bredare argumentativa sammanhang i vilket bloggtexterna ingår. Utifrån 
detta perspektiv undersöks bloggdiskursen på tre nivåer: på en 
innehållsmässig nivå, på en retorisk nivå – där såväl verbala, (audio-)visuella, 
digitala som kommunikativa element beaktas – och slutligen på en samhällelig 
nivå, i syfte att beakta bloggdiskursens potentiella sociala och politiska följder. 
Avhandlingen bidrar till socialpsykologisk forskning i nationalistisk 
politisk kommunikation på tre centrala sätt. För det första, genom att utforska 
såväl vita mäns, kvinnors som invandrares och etniska 
minoritetsmedlemmars högerpopulistiska och nationalistiska diskurs belyser 
avhandlingen den mångfald av röster som finns inom högerpopulistiska 
partier. Kvinnor och invandrare kan anses befinna sig i en särskilt 
problematisk situation inom dessa partier: kvinnorna tvingas balansera 
mellan samhälleliga jämställdhetsnormer å ena sidan och sitt partis 
patriarkala ideologi å den andra, medan invandrare eller etniska 
minoritetsmedlemmar måste förena denna personliga bakgrund med sin 
invandringsfientliga politiska tillhörighet. Avhandlingen belyser de sätt på 
vilka dessa politiker i sina bloggtexter strävar efter att lösa sådana dilemman 
utan att svika sitt partis patriarkala och nationalistiska politiska agenda. 
För det andra utvidgar avhandlingen det kritiska diskursiva och retoriska 
psykologiska perspektivet den tillämpar med verktyg från narrativ psykologi, 
visuell social semiotik samt forskning i internetbaserad politisk 
kommunikation. Därmed fokuserar forskningen inte enbart på det skrivna 
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ordet, utan tar även i beaktande de (audio-)visuella, digitala och 
kommunikativa element som i bloggarna samverkar med klassiska retoriska 
strategier, narrativa strukturer samt socialt och kulturellt förankrade 
diskursiva resurser i konstruktionen av nationalistiska politiska argument. 
För det tredje påvisar studien att bloggarnas (audio-)visuella, digitala och 
kommunikativa funktioner gör det möjligt för bloggaren att presentera socialt 
känsliga och till och med rasistiska politiska budskap utan att hen själv tvingas 
ta explicit ställning till ämnet i fråga. Genom dessa funktioner utgör bloggar 
en optimal plattform för nationalistisk politisk kommunikation: de möjliggör 
förmedlingen av slagkraftiga och trovärdiga politiska argument som vädjar till 
läsarnas känslor, medan de samtidigt beskyddar politikern från beskyllningar 
för rasism. 
Nationalistisk diskurs i politiska bloggar förblir inte i bloggosfären, utan 
når även traditionella medier och påverkar sålunda den allmänna samhälleliga 
och politiska debatten. I syfte att vi bättre ska kunna förstå uttrycksformerna 
och de samhälleliga följderna av samtida nationalistisk politisk 
kommunikation uppmanar denna avhandling därmed  socialpsykologisk 
forskning att utveckla sina verktyg för att kritiskt studera politisk 
bloggdiskurs. 
  
 9 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This doctoral dissertation could not have been written without the invaluable 
support I have received from colleagues, friends and family throughout this 
process. 
I would like, first of all, to express my most cordial gratitude towards my 
supervisors Doctor Inari Sakki and Professor Karmela Liebkind. Inari, no 
rhetorical or discursive constructions can describe how grateful I am to have 
gotten the chance to become your student, co-worker and friend. I have 
learned immensely from you and it has been a joy to work with you. I hope I 
may continue doing both in the future. Karmela, thank you for having 
supported me and my research ambitions in both concrete and more abstract 
ways ever since my undergraduate studies in social psychology. Without your 
encouragement I would never have started on this PhD endeavour in the first 
place. Thank you for everything you have taught me, and thank you for 
inspiring me and believing in me. 
I am utterly grateful to the external examiners of my dissertation, Professor 
Nick Hopkins and Professor Martha Augoustinos, for your insightful and 
constructive comments on my work. I am honoured that you took the time to 
work yourself through these pages. It is both a joy and a privilege that Nick 
Hopkins agreed to act as opponent for my dissertation. I am also highly 
indebted to the anonymous reviewers and journal editors whose 
commentaries greatly helped me to improve the individual articles and thus 
this dissertation. 
I am very grateful to Nylands nation, the Oskar Öflund Foundation, the 
Cultural Foundation for Sweden and Finland, the Finnish Konkordia-
Foundation, and the Doctoral Programme in Social Sciences for having funded 
this work at different stages. Thank you for having made this project possible. 
This doctoral research was carried out within the discipline of Social 
Psychology at the Department of Social Research of the University of Helsinki. 
I am thankful for having been part of this working community during these 
years. I am especially grateful to the head of discipline, Professor Anna-Maija 
Pirttilä-Backman, for your incredible commitment to and support for us 
doctoral students. Thank you for always finding the time for a chat, and for 
always being there for me. 
I am also deeply grateful to the two research groups that I have belonged to 
during my doctoral studies: the ESSO-research group on ethnic relations, led 
by Professor Karmela Liebkind and Professor Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti; and the 
Everyday Thinking Coffee group hosted by Professor Anna-Maija Pirttilä-
Backman (usually at her place, sometimes including champagne). Thank you, 
everyone, for helping me with my work, for letting me take part of yours, and 
for all our exchanges that have taught me about the richness of social 
psychological research. As for the slightly more informal research community 
10 
that I have been part of, entitled Discipline Beers, it has provided me with 
pivotal strength and inspiration during times of scholarly fatigue.  
I would furthermore sincerely like to thank my fellow doctoral students and 
colleagues, who have supported, advised and helped me during this PhD 
project. I would especially like to thank Emma Nortio and Johanna Kronstedt, 
whose friendships have meant more to me than any PhD ever could. Emma, 
thank you for all the discussions we have had about our – sometimes 
disheartening – research topics, and about our thoughts, hopes and worries as 
young researchers. And, very importantly, thank you for surviving the EASP 
summer school 2016 with me! Johanna, I am so lucky to have gotten to know 
you. Thank you for all the encouragement and support you have given me 
during these years. I admire and respect you in so many ways, and am 
incredibly grateful for our friendship.  
I would also like to thank the brilliant group of Critical readers, whose 
animated debates have challenged my thinking and helped me crystallize my 
own position as a researcher. I am also very much obliged to the NOPO 
research network on Nordic populism that has entailed a great source of 
inspiration for me throughout and especially in the beginning of my PhD 
studies. 
Finally, I express my gratitude to my family. My fellow Tauruses Edith 
Finne and Elina Andersson-Finne, thank you for the many times you have 
given me indispensable breaks from working on this dissertation. Nothing 
makes me realise the banality of my work-related worries like a smile or a wave 
from my goddaughter on a plain weekday. Elina, my beloved ‘sister’ and friend, 
thank you for all the times you have been a listening ear, a shoulder to cry on 
or company to laugh with. Thank you for standing by me through thick and 
thin. 
My cousin Linda Wallgren, let me express my heartfelt gratitude for our 
nowadays legendary ‘disputations’ – where on Earth would I be without them? 
My grandmother Carin Forsius-Wallgren, my primary feminist role model, 
thank you for always reminding me to believe in myself. I can see my 
grandfather’s proud smile in your eyes.  
Gudrun and Dieter Derichs, thank you for your genuine interest in my 
work, and for all your support and your warmth towards me. I feel utterly 
grateful and lucky to be part of your family. 
My mother Carina, my father Tom and my brother Tobias, let me save 
paper by quoting Anne of Green Gables and simply thank you with all my heart 
for your unfailing love and support. 
David, my dearest partner and friend, thank you for putting up with me 
during my countless and sometimes ridiculous outbursts of nervousness and 
self-doubt. Above all, thank you for having had faith in me from the moment 
we met. Both this dissertation and I are stronger individuals because of you.  
 
 
Helsinki, April 2017 
 11 
CONTENTS 
Abstract....................................................................................................... 3 
 .................................................................................................  7 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................... 9 
Contents ..................................................................................................... 11 
List of original publications ..................................................................... 13 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................... 14 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 15 
2 The context of the study: Finland and Sweden ............................... 19 
2.1 A short note on populism ....................................................... 19 
2.2 The rise of the populist radical right in Finland and Sweden 20 
2.3 What makes the Finnish-Swedish context special? ............... 24 
3 The social psychology of radical right discourse ............................ 28 
3.1 Radical right political discourse ............................................ 28 
3.2 The diversity of voices within populist radical right parties .. 33 
3.2.1 Exploring the worldview of women within populist radical 
right parties .......................................................................... 34 
3.2.2 Constructions of ethnic identity in populist radical right 
discourse ............................................................................... 36 
3.3 The peculiarities of political blogging ................................... 40 
3.4 A critical discursive and rhetorical psychological perspective 
on populist radical right political blogs .................................. 42 
4 Material and Methods ..................................................................... 47 
4.1 Material ................................................................................... 47 
4.1.1 Study I: blogs of extreme anti-immgration politicians ...... 48 
4.1.2 Study II: Blogs of female populist radical right politicians . 49 
Tiivistelmä
12 
4.1.3 Study III: Blogs of populist radical right politicians with 
immigrant or other ethnic minority background ............... 49 
4.1.4 Study IV: Two nationalist political blog-entries ................. 50 
4.2 Methods of analysis................................................................. 51 
5 Findings: The powerful discourse contained in populist radical right 
political blogs ....................................................................................... 54 
5.1 The discourse of Otherness in FP and SD political blogs ....... 54 
5.2 ‘We are no political alibis’ – women and immigrants within 
the populist radical right ........................................................ 60 
5.2.1 Dilemmas of feminism and patriarchy ................................ 61 
5.2.2 (In)compatible ethnic identities ......................................... 64 
5.3 The multifaceted character of discourse contained in political 
blogs: moving beyond the text ................................................ 67 
6 Discussion ........................................................................................ 73 
6.1 Empirical and theoretical reflections ..................................... 73 
6.2 Methodological reflections ..................................................... 79 
6.3 Ethical concerns ..................................................................... 82 
6.4 Future research ...................................................................... 83 
6.5 Practical implications ............................................................ 85 
6.6 Concluding remarks ............................................................... 86 
References ............................................................................................... 88 
 
 13 
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS 
This dissertation is based on the following publications: 
 
I. Sakki, I.  & Pettersson, K. (2016). Discursive Constructions of 
Otherness in Populist Radical Right Political Blogs. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 46(2), 156–170.  
 
II. Pettersson, K. (2017). Ideological dilemmas of female populist radical 
right politicians. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 24(1), 7–22. 
 
III. Pettersson. K., Liebkind, K., & Sakki, I. (2016). ’You who are an 
immigrant, why are you in the Sweden Democrats? Discourse & 
Society, 27(6), 624–641.  
 
IV. Pettersson, K., & Sakki, I. (2017). ‘Pray for the fatherland!’ Discursive 
and digital strategies at play in nationalist political blogging. 
Qualitative Research in Psychology, advance online publication 
February 2nd. 
 
 
 
The publications are referred to in the text by their roman numerals. 
 
The original articles are reprinted here with the kind permission from the 
copyright holders John Wiley & Sons (Article I), Sage (Articles II and III) and 
Taylor & Francis (Article IV). 
14 
ABBREVIATIONS 
BNP The British National Party 
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDP Critical Discursive Psychology 
DPP The Danish People’s Party (Dan: Dansk Folkeparti) 
EU The European Union 
FN The National Front (Fr: Front National) 
FP The Finns Party (Fin: Perussuomalaiset) 
PP The Norwegian Progress Party (Nor: Fremskrittspartiet) 
 
SD The Sweden Democrats (Swe: Sverigedemokraterna) 
 
 
 15 
1 INTRODUCTION 
On September 10th 2016 the Neo-Nazi organisation the Finnish Defence 
League (Suomen vastarintaliike) holds a demonstration at the railway square 
in the centre of the Finnish capital. A young man who passes by the 
demonstration stops and spits on the ground in disgust. One of the 
demonstrators reacts by attacking the by-passer, who is badly wounded and 
sent to hospital. One week later the man dies of his wounds. 
Despite the fact that this was not the first instance during recent times of 
extremist violence on behalf of the Finnish Defence League and other 
extremist groups (Pullinen, 2016), and notwithstanding subsequent demands 
from the public and the political opposition alike to take measures against 
organised racist, violent and extremist movements, it took more than one week 
for the Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipilä to comment on the situation (Sipilä, 
2016). In a blog-entry, Sipilä finally denounced racism and violence and 
concluded that the laws regulating racist organisations and hate-speech are 
amendable. He did not, however, refer to the Finnish Defence League per se, 
or to neo-Nazis at all, but rather, he talked about the ‘incidence at the Railway 
Square’. In the same sentence he mentioned the so-called ‘Otanmäki-case’, 
where two asylum-seekers had been suspected of robbery and homicide. The 
Prime Minister continued his statement by discussing the topic of 
immigration, and the ways in which all Finns can participate in aiding the 
integration of migrants and refugees in Finland.  
On the same day as Sipilä wrote his entry, his colleague in the conservative 
government-coalition, Foreign Minister and leader of the populist radical right 
Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) Timo Soini (2016), also commented on the 
killing in his blog: 
 
Innocence does no harm. Violence is wrong, also the threat thereof. For 
me the human life is sacred from womb to grave. The events in Otanmäki 
and Helsinki during the last days are unequivocally wrong. This is the 
Finns Party’s opinion and mine. 
Timo Soini: blog-entry, September 19th, 2016.  
 
What can be concluded about these blog-statements that were widely 
quoted within mainstream news in Finland? First, obviously, that they 
condemn violence. Yet, one may ask why both Sipilä and Soini turned the 
discussion to concern broader questions of immigration and integration of 
asylum seekers and refugees, and why neither politician focused solely on the 
issue of what needs to be done in order to counter the violence of Neo-Nazi 
movements. It may be tempting to wonder if this had anything to do with the 
Finns Party’s members’ connections with such movements (Hiiro, 2016). 
Introduction 
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Many more critical questions could be raised about what is said and what is 
being left unsaid in these political blog-entries. Such questions do, in any case, 
reveal something about the topic of interest in this study: messages contained 
in political blogs can be complex and subtle, and contain meanings of broader 
social and political significance. 
The aforementioned tragic case and the politicians’ slow and weak 
reactions to it illustrate a development that has taken place not only in the 
small country of Finland, but indeed across Europe: that of societal tensions, 
radicalisation and violence, and the ruling politicians’ shortcomings in 
counteracting these problems. The beginning of the 21st century has certainly 
in many ways been a turbulent time for Europe. Europe has experienced a 
financial crisis; it has been shocked by the decision of the United Kingdom to 
(br)exit the European Union; it has been the target of brutal terrorism, it has 
received more than one million asylum seekers, migrants and refugees during 
what has been termed the largest global refugee crisis since the Second World 
War; and it has witnessed a new dawn for political parties with populist, 
nationalist, anti-immigration and anti-EU agendas.  
The ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, which the Finnish Prime Minister implicitly 
referred to in his blog one year later, caused turmoil in Europe, with conflicting 
views over the individual member-states’ responsibilities in receiving the 
refugees and asylum seekers from the war-laden countries of Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Both across and within national borders people were 
divided into camps of those who wished either to open or close these borders 
to the migrants. The concomitant societal polarisation and the failure of the 
ruling politicians to find a solution to the situation provided an opportunity 
for radical right parties across Europe to increase their support (Gutteridge, 
2015) by appealing to the voters with promises of protecting the nation and its 
people against the threats of uncontrolled mass-immigration and terrorism. 
This development took place also in the Nordic countries of Finland and 
Sweden, who witnessed the sudden arrival of asylum seekers whose number 
radically exceeded those of previous years. In times of strong norms against 
blatant expressions of racism and prejudice (Billig, 1988b, p. 94), however, 
politicians who wished to depict ‘outsiders’, that is, asylum-seekers, 
immigrants and ethnic and cultural minorities as ‘the problem’, were forced to 
seek new ways of expressing such views in socially appropriate ways. 
This doctoral dissertation explores how populist radical right politicians of 
the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, FP) in Finland and the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna, SD) in Sweden express nationalist arguments in their 
political blogs. The study draws inspiration from research that has pointed to 
the growing importance of social media in the transmission and gradual 
normalisation of radical right, nationalist and anti-immigration political 
discourse (e.g., Allen, 2011; Bratten, 2005; Lentin & Titley, 2011), and to the 
specific potential of political blogs to function as tools for voter engagement 
and mobilisation (Baumer, Sueyoshi & Tomlinson, 2011; Nilsson & Carlsson, 
2014). This pertains in particular to the context of this study – the Nordic 
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countries of Finland and Sweden, where the use of social media is significant 
in global comparison (Carlson, Djupsund & Strandberg, 2014), and where 
such media have been pivotal for the rise of the radical right in the 21st century 
(Hatakka, 2016; Horsti, 2015; Keskinen, 2013; Mäkinen, 2016). My present 
interest lies in how political blogs may function as a particularly important 
sphere for the construction and transmission of populist radical right and 
nationalist political messages. A comparison between the two countries allows 
me, moreover, to explore the social and historical situatedness of populist 
radical right political discourse. I will approach this topic from the critical 
discursive and rhetorical psychological perspectives developed within the field 
of social psychology. Through these perspectives I am able to explore what 
themes the discourse contains, how these themes are discussed, and what 
implications these formulations might have in a social and political sense.  
With this study I wish to contribute to previous social psychological 
research on radical right and nationalist political discourse in three central 
ways. First, in studying discourse contained in political blogs, I strive to 
increase the variety of material that we use for advancing our knowledge of 
social psychological phenomena, in this case, political communication and 
persuasion. Second, by delving into the discourse of women and other ethnic 
minority members who have chosen to join a populist radical right party, I 
seek to gain a deeper understanding of radical right discourse other than that 
of white men, whom previous research has predominantly focused on. Third, 
in moving ‘beyond the text’ in my analytical approach, I acknowledge the 
multitude of digital, (audio-)visual and communicative features that interact 
with the text in constructing and adding to the persuasive power of arguments 
contained in political blogs. In so doing, I aim to contribute to social 
psychological research into political communication and persuasion in 
contemporary societies. 
This doctoral dissertation is comprised of four separate studies and the 
present summary that sets out the theoretical and empirical background and 
aims of the research, presents its methods and material, and reflects upon its 
implications. The dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 2 I describe 
the context of the empirical material, namely, the countries of Finland and 
Sweden, and present the two populist radical right parties whose discourse I 
investigate. In chapter 3 I discuss the theoretical background and previous 
empirical research on the topics this study addresses. This chapter is 
comprised of social psychological – mainly critical discursive and rhetorical 
psychological – research on populist and radical right political discourse; 
feminist research on nationalism; social psychological and discursive research 
on ethnic identity; as well as research into online political communication. 
Here I also explicate how the present study situates itself within and between 
these streams of research, and how it seeks to contribute to social 
psychological and discursive research on political communication and 
persuasion. In chapter 4 I present the materials and methods used in the sub-
studies, and in chapter 5 I bring together the main findings of these studies. 
Introduction 
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Finally, in chapter 6, I reflect upon the contributions, limitations, ethical 
concerns and implications of my research. 
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2 THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: FINLAND 
AND SWEDEN 
In this chapter I will introduce the context of this study – that of Finland and 
Sweden. Before delving into the social, political and historical peculiarities of 
this context, especially those relevant for understanding the rise and nature of 
the populist radical right therein, I begin with a few remarks on a disputed 
concept. 
2.1 A SHORT NOTE ON POPULISM 
This is not a study about populism. Nevertheless, I use the term ‘populist 
radical right’ throughout this dissertation. In order not to overlook the vast 
research area of populism studies; therefore, some conceptual clarifications 
are in order. What is meant by ‘populist’? And what is meant by ‘populist 
radical right’? 
There are probably as many definitions of populism as there are scholars 
thereof. During the past decades the debate among political scientists about 
how to define populism has been intense. Disagreement persists about 
whether it should be regarded as an ideology, as a discourse, as a style, as a 
strategy, or as a combination of or perhaps neither of these (see e.g., Aslanidis, 
2016, for a comprehensive overview of this debate). A well-known definition 
of populism was formulated by Cas Mudde in 2004. According to Mudde, 
populism is an ideology that is inherently ‘thin’ as its aims are limited in scope, 
complexity and ambition, in contrast to other political ideologies of a more 
‘full’ character. Mudde defines populism as ‘an ideology that considers society 
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people’ (p. 543). Other 
theoreticians of populism, including the influential post-structuralist Ernesto 
Laclau (1977; 2005a; 2005b), view populism as a discourse, where emphasis 
is on articulations that position the underdog (‘us, the people’) against the 
powerful (‘them, the elite’). Similarly, Margaret Canovan (1999, p. 3) 
conceptualises populism as an ‘appeal to “the people” against both the 
established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values in society’. 
The connotation of the label ‘populist radical right’ is perhaps less 
contested, yet its relation to terms such as ‘right-wing populism’ (e.g., Mouffe, 
2005), ‘extreme right-wing populism’ (e.g., Rydgren, 2005), ‘far right’ (e.g. 
Ellinas, 2010), extreme right (e.g., Carter, 2005), and ‘nationalist populist’ 
(e.g., Hellström, 2016) remains somewhat unclear. Scholars tend to agree that 
populist radical right parties take an authoritarian stance on socio-cultural 
issues (e.g., Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2005). This 
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position includes promoting strict criminal laws and a strong military, being 
sceptical towards gender equality and the rights of sexual minorities, arguing 
for the maintenance of traditional family values, and viewing the nation as an 
ethnically and culturally homogeneous entity that needs to be protected from 
multiculturalism and immigration (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). The question of 
whether populist radical right parties can adequately be placed on the socio-
economic scale is, however, a much more complex issue, and views differ over 
the extent to which these parties place importance on socio-economic matters 
at all (see Jungar & Jupskås, 2014, on this issue). I will return to how the FP 
and the SD position themselves with regards to these questions in the 
following section. 
With these conceptual considerations in mind, and with the risk of 
repeating myself, as populism is not my main focus it is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to delve deeper into the debate on its nature. Rather, the aim 
of this research project is to explore how articulations of exclusionary 
nationalist and anti-feminist political stances are conveyed through political 
blogging in 21st century Finland and Sweden. These articulations are put forth 
by members of the FP and SD, who during this time have been able to dictate 
the debate on how and against whom the borders of their respective nations 
should be defined.  These parties have indeed been attached with the label 
‘populist radical right’. However, I adhere to the emphasis by Laclau and 
followers on the form of populism, that is, on populism as something that is 
done rather than something that a political actor is or is not. Consequently, I 
believe that the ‘populist’, anti-immigration and anti-feminist arguments of 
the FP and SD that are the focus of this study might as well have been 
expressed by representatives of other political parties. As I will discuss further 
in chapter 6, this is indeed a phenomenon we have witnessed in both Finland 
and Sweden, as well as elsewhere in Europe, in the time-period during which 
this study was conducted. With this in mind, I maintain that studying these 
political articulations, and elaborating on their consequences, remains a 
pertinent issue. 
2.2 THE RISE OF THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT IN 
FINLAND AND SWEDEN 
Despite this study’s particular focus on Finland and Sweden, I will first say a 
few words about their neighbouring Scandinavian countries as well. During 
the 20th century the political fields in the Nordic countries of Denmark, 
Norway, Finland and Sweden were relatively stable, with conservative, 
agrarian, liberal, communist and social democratic parties taking turns in 
forming governments (Demker & Svåsand, 2005; Hellström, 2016; Jungar & 
Jupskås, 2014). The impact of social democracy remained strong, and the 
welfare state – the famous ‘Nordic model’ – was developed in conjunction with 
market economic reforms (Hellström, 2016). Since the turn of the new 
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millennium, however, all four countries have witnessed the rise of political 
parties with populist and anti-immigration agendas, shattering the traditional 
five-party hegemony substantially.  
These newcomers on the political scene, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk 
Folkeparti, DPP), the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, PP), the 
Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, FP) and the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna, SD) have very different backgrounds. The DPP and PP 
emerged during the neoliberal populist wave of the 1970s (Goul Andersen & 
Bjørklund, 1990), the FP stems from an agrarian populist and social 
conservative Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue, SMP) (Arter, 
2010), whereas the SD have their roots in extreme-right and neo-fascist 
movements (Hellström & Nilsson, 2010). Nevertheless, Ann-Cathrine Jungar 
and Anders Ravik-Jupskås (Jungar, 2016; Jungar & Jupskås, 2014) argue that 
the Nordic populist parties have, despite their different historical legacies, 
converged ideologically, now representing socio-culturally authoritarian and 
socio-economically centrist views. Thus, the authors argue, these parties 
nowadays form their own party family within the broader populist radical right 
party family in Europe. The PP constitutes an exception of sorts, as the party 
takes a less authoritarian and more economically right-wing position, and may 
accordingly more rightfully be regarded as combining populist radical right 
and traditional conservative ideological positions. Nevertheless, all four 
parties share an anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism position, and an 
ethnically nationalistic worldview that sees a ‘unified people’ as an ethnic, 
historical and linguistic entity. Contrary to (the various) scientific definitions 
of multiculturalism as, for example, a political philosophy (e.g., Harris, 2001; 
Kymlicka, 2012; Taylor, 1994), as integration of all ethnic and cultural groups, 
that is, when ‘cultural diversity is a feature of the society as a whole, including 
all the various ethnocultural groups’ (Berry, 2011, p. 2.7); or as emphasizing 
‘equality between and respect for the pluralism of cultures and group 
identities’ (Verkuyten, 2007, p. 280), these parties’ understanding of the 
concept is that it entails the paramount threat to the survival of the ethnically 
and culturally homogeneous nation. 
The Nordic populist radical right parties, whose names already indicate 
their nationalist position, have formal and informal connections with each 
other as well as with other populist radical right parties in Europe (Jungar & 
Jupskås, 2014). Whereas radical right parties often adhere to what Kitschelt 
and McGann (1995) term ‘the winning formula’, that is, they typically combine 
a socio-culturally authoritarian position with a neo-liberal stance on socio-
economic issues, the position of the Nordic populist parties is somewhat 
peculiar. The parties act in a context which bears the international reputation 
as the ‘cradle of social welfare’, and where both political and popular support 
for the maintenance of the welfare system remains strong (Jaeger, 2012; 
Pyrhönen, 2015). Indeed, the parties – with the exception of the PP – support 
the maintenance of the social democratic legacy of the Nordic welfare model. 
However, the parties hold what has been coined as a welfare chauvinist and 
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nationalist stance, according to which welfare benefits are meant for ‘the 
common (Danish, Finnish or Swedish) man’; and not for immigrant Others 
(e.g., Mudde, 2007; Norocel, 2016; Pyrhönen, 2015, Van der Waal, Achterberg, 
Houtman, de Koster & Manevska, 2010).  
In the Finnish context, the FP managed to shock both a national and 
international public with its ‘Jytky’-landslide victory in the national 
parliamentary elections of 2011. The party, receiving a mere 4.1 per cent of the 
votes in the previous elections in 2007 (Statistics Finland, 2011), now became 
the third largest party in Finland, gaining 19.1 per cent of the votes. In 2015 
the FP, now the second largest party, gained 17.7 per cent of the votes and took 
place in the country’s governing coalition (Statistics Finland, 2015). In Finnish 
the FP are called Perussuomalaiset, which literally means the ‘ordinary’ or 
‘basic’ Finns. Before 2011 the FP had no official English name and the party 
was until then – and still often is – called ‘The True Finns’ in public debates. 
The capitalising of the term ‘Finns’ when adopting the name of the ‘Finns 
Party’ reflects the FP’s aim to come across as the only genuine representative 
of the Finnish people (cf. Sakki & Cottier, 2012). Given the pejorative 
connotation of the term ‘populist’ it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the 
party does in fact refer to itself with this term (e.g., Finns Party, 2011, p. 6).  
The FP was formed in 1995 as a continuation of the former Finnish Rural 
Party; however, nowadays support for the Finnish national culture and 
resistance to the EU, and to multiculturalism and immigration, are at the focal 
point of its agenda (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). The party can be said to be 
divided into two camps: the more ‘moderate’ one, headed by the charismatic 
and popular party leader (and, at the time of writing, Foreign Minister of 
Finland) Timo Soini, on the one hand, and the more extreme anti-immigration 
faction, championed by former MP and current MEP Jussi Halla-aho on the 
other1, In general, the party’s voters are moving from the centre towards the 
right end of the political spectrum, a shift that has accelerated in speed since 
the party’s entry into the conservative government in 2015 and its loss of voters 
especially to the Social Democratic party (Pitkänen & Westinen, 2016). 
Turning to the context of Sweden, the triumphal march of the SD in 
Swedish politics began modestly at the local level in 1998, when the party 
received its first seats in the country’s local municipalities. By 2006 it had 
extended its representation to cover half of the country’s municipalities 
(Hellström, 2016). The party’s national breakthrough came in 2010, when it 
received 5.7 per cent of the votes, thus crossing the 4 per cent electoral 
threshold to the national parliament for the first time. The SD, to their own 
delight and to the dismay of the political establishment, managed to double 
their support in the subsequent 2014 elections, gaining 12.9 per cent of the 
votes (Elections Sweden, 2014).  
                                                 
1 In March 2017 Timo Soini declared that he will not continue as party leader after the party’s general 
assembly in June 2017. Jussi Halla-aho, in turn, announced in March 2017 that he is running for the 
position as party leader. 
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The founding members of the party, which was originally born in 1988, 
came from violent extreme-right and neo-Nazi movements such as ‘White 
Arian Resistance’ (Vit Ariskt Motstånd) and ‘Keep Sweden Swedish’ (Bevara 
Sverige Svenskt) and persons invoved in ‘white power music’ (Hellström & 
Nilsson, 2010; Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Since the 1990s, however, the SD 
have tried hard to clean up their image by ridding themselves of extremists 
and adopting a more moderate approach (Rydgren, 2005). Nowadays, the 
party calls itself ‘social conservative’ in terms of political ideological 
positioning, and defines ‘Swedishness’ not in terms of race or ethnicity, but in 
terms of culture (Hellström & Nilsson, 2010). Nevertheless, and as we shall 
see, the SD’s conception of what constitutes ‘Swedish culture’ seems to carry a 
deeper, essentialist meaning that cannot lightly be accessed by ‘outsiders’. 
As already touched upon, the political agendas of the SD and FP are closely 
related, and the two parties can nowadays be regarded as belonging to the 
same populist radical right party family (cf. Arter, 2010; Jungar & Jupskås, 
2014). Both the FP and the SD strongly deny that they support racism; thus, 
the party leaderships are constantly striking a balance between preserving a 
moderate image, on the one hand, and the radical, xenophobic voices that 
persist in the parties, on the other (Hatakka, Niemi & Välimäki, 2017). Yet, the 
differing origins of the two parties – populist agrarian in case of the FP and 
extreme-right in case of the SD – remain visible in the parties’ actions as well 
as their rhetoric. The party leaderships have, for example, reacted differently 
to the scandals related to racist talk and deeds that have occurred within the 
parties: Timo Soini of the FP tends to react vaguely and dodge responsibility 
(Horsti, 2015), whereas Jimmie Åkesson of the SD is forced to take more 
explicit stances against such behaviour in order to shake off the party’s racist 
label (e.g., Bjereld, 2012). Even though opinion polls indicate a rapidly 
shrinking popularity for the FP since it entered government position in 2015, 
whereas support for the SD stays strong and relatively stable, the FP is treated 
like any of the big established parties, whilst the SD remain ‘outsiders’, 
excluded and despised by the media and political opponents alike (cf. e.g., 
Hatakka et al., 2017; Hellström, 2016; Hagelund, Hellström, Meret & 
Pettersson, forthcoming).  
In line with what is typical for radical right parties, both the FP and SD 
remain numerically male-dominated, with the FP’s parliamentary group 
consisting of 26 male and 11 female MP’s, and the SD’s of 37 male as compared 
to 11 female MP’s. Like most contemporary political parties, the FP and SD do 
not proclaim that they oppose gender equality, yet neither party have 
explicated aims in relation to this topic. Rather, they resist structural measures 
aimed at enhancing women’s position in society through the argument that 
gender equality has already been achieved (cf., Lockwood Harris, Palazzolo & 
Savage, 2012; Norocel, 2016). Indeed, the politics of the FP and SD strongly 
rely, apart from the emphasis on resistance to immigration, on ideas of male 
power and dominance, where the relationship between men and women is 
based on difference and complementarity, and where the traditional family is 
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seen as a fundamental pillar of society (FP parliamentary election programme, 
2011; SD Programme of Principles, 2011; cf. Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014; 
Norocel, 2013). Further, as feminist researchers have shown, these parties use 
the notion of gender equality as a card in the political game, where ‘we’ the 
gender equal Europeans (or Finns / Swedes) are positioned against ‘them’, the 
immigrants, oftentimes Muslims (De los Reyes, Molina & Mulinari, 2003; 
Horsti, 2016; Keskinen, 2013; Keskinen et al., 2009; Mulinari & Neergaard, 
2014; Norocel, 2013). In Norocel’s (2016, p. 5) wording, for European populist 
radical right parties ‘the nominal gender equality endeavour becomes a 
discrete cue for cultural racism’. I return to the topic of this gendered version 
of nationalism of the populist radical right in chapter 3.2.1 below. 
2.3 WHAT MAKES THE FINNISH-SWEDISH CONTEXT 
SPECIAL? 
The two neighbouring countries of Finland and Sweden have much in 
common: they have close connections with each other and the other Nordic 
countries, they have strong welfare systems, and the position of women is 
advanced in international comparison. The countries even share a history of 
forming one common nation from the 13th century until the Eastern part, that 
is, today’s Finland, became a part of Russia as a result of the Swedish-Russian 
war in 1808-09. Nevertheless, there are significant contextual differences that 
make a comparison between populist radical right discourses in the two 
countries interesting. The first one relates to the aforementioned different 
positions of the FP (in government) and the SD (a ‘pariah-party’ in opposition) 
and the contrasting treatment the parties receive in the public domain. The 
other factors, to which we shall now turn, concern first, the desynchronized 
developments of the social democratic welfare models in the two countries; 
second, the different emphases the countries’ political scenes have put on 
matters related to gender equality and feminism; and finally, the history and 
current state of immigration and asylum policies in the two countries. 
With regards to the first of these three matters, Sweden’s history as a social 
democratic welfare state is long, with the concept of the folkhem (the people’s 
home) dating back approximately 100 years. The country is commonly 
regarded as the primary representative of this welfare model (e.g., Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Hellström, 2016). In Finland, by contrast, the welfare system 
started to resemble such a social democratic, universal understanding version 
thereof as late as in the 1980s, only to be limited again due to the financial 
crisis in the 1990s (Anttonen & Sipilä, 2000). Finland and Sweden thus 
constitute the two ‘extremes’ in terms of the development of the Nordic welfare 
model, which makes a comparison between the two countries of populist 
radical right discourse of welfare, and to whom welfare provisions do and do 
not belong, particularly interesting (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2014). 
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Second, as noted in the previous section, the position of the FP and the SD 
vis-à-vis gender equality is contradictory: on the one hand, they actively resist 
attempts at enhancing equality between the genders, yet on the other hand, 
the parties rhetorically use the notion of gender equality as a defining feature 
of ‘us’, the Finnish or Swedish people. This double-edged stance on gender 
equality of the SD and FP should certainly be examined in light of the 
reputation as well as the collective self-image within the Nordic countries of 
‘world leadership in gender equality’ (Magnusson et al., 2008, p. 7). Tellingly, 
both in the Finnish and Swedish language there are separate words for, on the 
one hand, equality for all (Fin: yhdenvertaisuus, Swe: jämlikhet) and, on the 
other, equality between the genders (Fin: tasa-arvo, Swe: jämställdhet). 
Finland was among the first countries in the world to establish women’s 
suffrage in 1906; Sweden followed in 1921. In the World Economic Forum’s 
latest Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum, 2016), which maps 
relative gaps between women and men across the areas of health, education, 
economy and politics, Finland ranks number two and Sweden number four in 
international comparison.  
Yet, the discourse of gender equality and feminism seems to have gained 
more influence within Swedish as compared with Finnish politics. Indicative 
of this is that in 2014 the newly elected Swedish Foreign Minister proclaimed 
that she is pursuing a ‘feminist foreign policy’. Further, in 2016 the Swedish 
government in 2016 founded a gender equality authority and declared itself 
feminist (Government of Sweden, 2016). Similarly illustrative is the rising 
electoral support for the feminist and anti-racist political party Feminist 
Initiative, which in its campaign to the 2014 national parliamentary elections 
profiled itself as the political antithesis of the SD. In Finland, by contrast, the 
programme of the conservative government elected in 2015 was void of a 
gender equality perspective – a matter the government received critique for 
from academics (Pusa, 2016). Finland, moreover, long lacked any official 
feminist political movement, yet at the time of writing (2017) a Finnish 
feminist party has been founded (Feministinen Puolue, 2017). Swedish 
legislation pertaining to the rights of sexual minorities is, furthermore, more 
liberal than its Finnish counterpart: Sweden has allowed gay marriage since 
2009, whereas in Finland a torn parliament in 2014 approved a citizen’s 
initiative for a law that eventually allowed equal marriage in March 2017. 
The third issue mentioned above concerns the two countries’ histories and 
current policies with regards to immigration. In contrast to the European 
colonial ‘super-powers’ such as the United Kingdom, Spain and France, larger-
scale immigration to Finland and Sweden only took off after the Second World 
War (Palmberg, 2009), and the countries are indeed often regarded as 
‘outsiders’ of colonialism (Vuorela, 2009). This view is, however, somewhat 
problematic in its simplicity: Sweden (to which Finland belonged) did possess 
a number of colonies for example in the West Indies. More importantly, 
colonial ideology reached far beyond its borders, thus being ‘outside’ 
colonialism in a politico-spatial sense did not mean you did not partake in and 
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inherit it ideologically. The concept of ‘colonial complicity’ refers to this 
peculiar role that the Nordic countries have had in the colonial projects, being 
neither core participants nor innocent bystanders (Vuorela, 2009). A 
consequence of this, according to Palmberg (2009), is that the inhabitants of 
the Nordic countries may today be less prepared for dealing with the 
prejudices non-white immigrants encounter, and racist expressions may more 
readily be seen as mere impoliteness towards strangers than as expressions of 
historically rooted ideologies.  
After ‘modern’ immigration began in the Nordic region after the Second 
World War, Finland and Sweden chose to follow rather different paths in 
terms of their immigration and asylum policies. Despite the fact that the 
population of Sweden is nowadays almost double that of Finland (10 million 
compared with 5.5 million), the following figures reflect the asymmetry 
between the countries’ immigration and asylum policies. Today, the 
percentages of foreign-borns in the two countries are quite disparate: 16.9 per 
cent in Sweden, compared with 5.8 per cent in Finland (World Economic 
Forum, 2015). Indeed, until the so-called refugee-crisis hit the countries in 
2015, Sweden was widely known for its liberal asylum and immigration policy, 
illustrated for example in the fact that Sweden received 83,301 and accepted 
31,220 asylum applications in 2014 (Swedish Migration Board, 2014). 
Finland, by contrast, has abided by a very strict policy, with corresponding 
figures of 3,706 and 1,346 for 2014 (Finnish Immigration Service, 2015). In 
2015, the year of the ‘refugee crisis’, 162 877 people sought asylum in Sweden 
(Swedish Migration Board, 2015). That year Finland received 30,000 asylum 
applications, a number ten times greater than in previous years (Finnish 
Ministry of the Interior, 2016).  
The sudden increase in asylum seekers to Finland in 2015 brought about 
an intense debate among politicians and the public alike about how the 
country should and could react. The polarisation between pro- and anti-
immigration voices that had been reality in Sweden for many years now 
deepened in Finland as well. From its position in the Finnish government-
coalition, the FP was able to influence Finland’s policy-making that aimed to 
render Finland ‘unattractive’ in the eyes of asylum seekers, and to sharpen 
conditions for asylum, family unification, return-policy and appeals against 
negative asylum decisions. The government’s policy engendered public 
outrage and protests. It also received critique from legal and human rights 
experts who deemed it to breach both the Finnish constitution and 
international human rights law (Finnish Broadcasting Company, 2016; 
Junkkari, 2016; van Gulik & Laajapuro, 2016). 
Sweden initially stuck to its open immigration and asylum policy when the 
number of asylum seekers surged in the autumn of 2015. The government 
retreated from it in early 2016, however, for instance by sharpening border 
controls and conditions for asylum and family reunification (Muilu, 2016), a 
matter that was seen as a victory of sorts for the SD who had long advocated 
such a policy shift. Sweden’s introduction of passport controls at the Danish 
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border soon spread across the Nordic region (Norden, 2016). Thus, as a 
consequence of the increased number of refugees and asylum seekers, freedom 
of movement within the Nordic countries was paused for the first time since 
its establishment more than 60 years ago. Both the Finnish and the Swedish 
restricted asylum-policies received a critical mentioning in Amnesty 
International’s 2016/17 annual report on human rights violations across the 
world (Amnesty International, 2017).  
The aforementioned factors – the reputation of Finland and Sweden as 
‘cradles of social welfare’ and ‘champions of gender equality’; the rise of the 
radical right in the two countries; their diverging histories and policies related 
to immigration and asylum (and the convergence of these policies after 2015); 
the differences between the FP’s and SD’s historical legacies and the 
similarities between their policies; and the differing ways in which they are 
treated by others – make the Finnish-Swedish setting an empirically 
interesting one for the examination of nationalist political discourse. In other 
words, these aspects entail that the FP and SD are pursuing and articulating 
their political aims under similar, yet in crucial aspects different conditions. 
In light of this, I began this research project with the expectation that 
exclusionary and gendered nationalist political appeals in Finland and Sweden 
may differ not only from each other, but also from those in previously studied 
country-contexts such as the UK, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. It is 
to social psychological research conducted on radical right discourse in these 
and other countries that we shall now turn.  
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3 THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICAL 
RIGHT DISCOURSE 
3.1 RADICAL RIGHT POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
The free movement of people across national borders within the EU in 
conjunction with increasing pressures on the union to receive people fleeing 
from the world’s conflict-laden zones has fuelled nationalist tendencies in 
many European countries. Nationalist political aims have been expressed 
especially by populist and radical right parties who position themselves as 
defenders of the sovereign nation-states and their peoples against the external 
pressures of immigration and globalisation that are framed in terms of danger 
and threat. The increasing popular support for populist and radical right 
political parties across Europe has, in turn, triggered social and political 
scientific researchers’ interest in the penetrative power of their rhetoric. A vast 
amount of this research has, rather unsurprisingly, focused on one of the core 
elements of this rhetoric: its hostility towards immigrants.  
Social psychologists have already for decades been interested in the ways 
that anti-immigrant political views are expressed in an age where blatant 
expressions of prejudice and racism are unlikely to gain any points of political 
credibility (e.g., Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Billig, 1988b). A defining feature 
of contemporary radical right political discourse is indeed its deracialisation 
(Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Reeves, 1983), that is, that notions of race and 
ethnicity have largely been replaced by other constructs, for example that of 
the nation and national belonging. Here, appeals to restrict immigration are 
warranted through arguments about the protection of national borders and 
preservation of a ‘national identity’ (van Dijk, 1993a; Wodak & van Dijk, 
2000). Such talk, even though the role of race is discursively downplayed, may 
nevertheless serve similarly racialised and discriminatory functions as blatant 
racist language (Augoustinos & Every, 2007).  
Another way in which racist discourse has been ‘sanitized’ from notions of 
race (e.g., Barker, 1981; Gilroy, 1993) is through references to cultural rather 
than racial differences (e.g., Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Richardson & 
Colombo, 2014; Verkuyten, 2003; 2013; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This 
phenomenon has been accompanied by the entry of immigrants in general and 
Muslims in particular as the primary Other in radical right political discourse 
that previously was dominated by anti-Semitism2. In this discourse, references 
                                                 
2 Yet, there are troubling signs of rising anti-Semitism in Europe, as manifested in the increasing 
amount of hate-crimes aimed at Jews in several European countries (OSCE, 2016). Moreover, research 
on European fascist discourse in the 20th and 21st centuries demonstrates that some past patterns, 
including anti-Semitic rhetoric, continue to appear in the discourses of contemporary radical right 
parties in many European countries (cf. e.g., Billig, 1978, 1989; Richardson, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008; 
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are commonly made to incompatible cultural and ideological differences 
between Islam on the one hand, and Western and Christian culture on the 
other. Typically, misogynist, undemocratic, intolerant and authoritarian 
values are depicted as inherent features of Islamic culture that thus constitutes 
the contradistinction to the pillars of liberalism, democracy, tolerance and 
human and especially women’s rights that the Western or European societies 
rest on. Such cultural essentialist discourse implies that since these 
differences are inherent, essential characteristics of cultures, they cannot be 
overcome. In other words, according to this view the co-existence of Islam with 
Western and Christian values is an impossibility. This anti-Islamic discourse 
serves to protect the speaker from accusations of racism or intolerance, first, 
because he or she places him- or herself as an explicit defender of benevolent, 
liberal values (cf. Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and second, because criticism is 
directed at an abstract target, that is, at Islam as a culture and ideology, and 
not at individual Muslims (e.g., Richardson & Colombo, 2014; Verkuyten, 
2003; 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). 
This and other self-defensive discursive strategies (van Dijk, 1993a) that 
protect the speaker from accusations of holding prejudiced or racist views 
certainly exist in everyday talk as well (e.g., Augoustinos & Every, 2007). The 
need for them is, however, especially strong in the context of politics, where 
arguments are expressed precisely in order for the speaker to come across as 
trustworthy and informed, and for the sake of appealing to and persuading 
potential voters. The denial of racism (e.g., Bonilla-Silva & Forman, 2000; 
Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2006; van Dijk, 1992; 1993a) is 
such a strategy, which typically entails laying the grounds for negative views 
about immigrants or ethnic minorities with the disclaimer ‘I am not racist, 
but…’, or ‘I have nothing against immigrants, but…’. Once racism has been 
thus denied the speaker may take yet one further step: he or she can reverse it 
(van Dijk, 1993a; cf. Hopkins, Reicher & Levine, 1997). In the context of radical 
right politics this can mean accusing either immigrants of being racist towards 
the majority population, or political opponents of having betrayed ‘the people’ 
in favour of immigrants, thus similarly engaging in racism towards the former 
group. The phenomenon of reversal of racism has been demonstrated 
empirically for instance in a study comparing radical right political leaflets in 
several European countries (Richardson & Colombo, 2014), as well as in the 
rhetoric of the French Front National (FN) (van Dijk, 1993a) and the British 
                                                 
Wodak & Richardson, 2013) and is still a central feature of, for instance, the rhetoric of the Hungarian 
radical right (Kovács and Szilágyi, 2013). Anti-semitic discourse has indeed not disappeared, but persists 
also in radical right hate-speech in Western European countries, sometimes in combination with more 
‘modern’ forms of racism (e.g., Wood & Finlay, 2008), and often concealed in the form of metaphors and 
humour, as demonstrated for example in the Swiss (Musolff, 2013), Austrian (Wodak, 2009) and French 
(Beauzamy, 2013) contexts. Indeed, sociologists Cousin and Fine (2012) have argued in favour of an 
approach to contemporary racism that integrates sensitivity to its anti-black, anti-Muslim as well as its 
anti-Semitic elements.  
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National Party (BNP) (Atton, 2006; Goodman & Johnson, 2014; Wood & 
Finlay, 2008). 
Other self-defensive discursive strategies documented by social 
psychological researchers include those that function to downplay the role of 
the speaker’s subjectivity and instead increase the air of credibility and matter-
of-factness of a given argument. The speaker may, for instance, refer to 
‘common-sense knowledge’ (e.g., Billig, 1987; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b), to 
external ‘facts’ and prevailing consensus (e.g., Potter, 1996; Verkuyten, 1998), 
or to factors unrelated to issues of race and ethnicity, such as economic or 
societal ones (e.g., Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley, 1999), when justifying 
negative stances towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Commonly, 
radical right politicians deploy the strategy of generalising negative behaviour 
to a homogenised outgroup, that is, they refer to single cases of criminality 
committed by immigrants, and to crime statistics based on nationality only 
whilst omitting other demographic features that are statistically connected 
with crime, such as age, gender, urban/rural residence and socio-economic 
class. This creates an illusory direct causality between the nationality or 
religion of the perpetrator and the crime, and serves to ‘show’ that immigrants 
and asylum-seekers are over-represented in crime and rape statistics (e.g., 
Wood & Finlay, 2008), thereby motivating sharpened immigration and return 
policies. Other times resistance to immigration can be warranted by depicting 
immigrants and asylum-seekers as entailing excessive costs to society and 
exploiting the welfare system (e.g., Mudde, 2007), a matter to which we shall 
return shortly.   
What the aforementioned rhetorical strategies accomplish, in sum, is that 
they serve efficiently to construct the speaker as informed, logical and un-
biased, and immigrants and asylum-seekers as deviant, inferior and/or 
undeserving Others (Condor, 1988; Hopkins et al., 1997; van Dijk, 1993a). In 
other words, they serve to give a negative Other and positive self-presentation 
(van Dijk, 1992). In the context of populist radical right political discourse, this 
image is further strengthened by depicting the self and, in social psychological 
terms, the ingroup, typically the own political party, as representatives of ‘the 
common people’ (e.g., Mudde, 2007; Rapley, 1998; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 
2012). The speaker positions him- or herself as standing by these ‘common’ or 
‘ordinary’ people and protecting their rights. Here, another negatively 
portrayed Other or outgroup enters the scene, this time represented not by 
immigrants, but by political antagonists, typically (female) leftist and green 
politicians, feminists and defenders of multiculturalism. This Other becomes 
accused of elitism, and of favouring immigrants and ethnic minority members 
at the expense of ‘the people’. The juxtaposition between the self as a 
prototypical member of the ‘ordinary people’ can be highlighted through the 
use of colloquial language and appeals to ‘common-sense’, as studies for 
example in the Netherlands (Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012) and Australia 
(Rapley, 1998) have demonstrated. When combined with the afore-described 
strategy of reversing racism, this discourse constructs the political antagonist 
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as an elitist and racist Other, whereas the self and its fellow ingroup members 
of ‘the people’, in turn, become the ‘true’ victims of racism. Thus claiming the 
position of a target of racism can be an efficient way for radical right 
politicians to shake off their party’s reputation of being the perpetrator thereof 
(cf. Wood & Finlay, 2008). 
These constructions of ‘us against them’ in radical right political discourse 
capture much of what Reicher, Haslam and Rath (2008), from the perspective 
of social identity and social categorisation theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), have called the Five-Step 
Social Identity Model of the development of collective hate. Discussing 
examples of outgroup hate ranging from the atrocities committed by the Nazis 
to contemporary racism and Islamophobia, the authors propose that the 
explanation for such acts of hatred can be sought in the following five-step 
process: 1) the construction of an ingroup with a common identity; 2) the 
definition of targets as external to the ingroup; 3) the representation of these 
targets as endangering ingroup identity; 4) the championing of the ingroup as 
(uniquely) good; and 5) embracing the eradication of the outgroup as 
necessary to the defence of virtue (Reicher et al., 2008, p. 1313). Essentially, 
through this process outgroup hatred and intolerance – even eradication – 
become not only warranted but celebrated as a necessary, moral virtue in 
order for the ingroup to be protected from destruction. As emphasized by the 
authors, the construction of the ingroup as good and virtuous is as essential as 
the construction of the outgroup as bad and threatening to the ingroup. The 
model has been applied by Verkuyten (2013) in his study of the anti-Islamic 
discourse of the Dutch radical right party leader Geert Wilders. Verkuyten 
showed how, indeed, Wilders constructed an image in which the eradication 
of Islam in Holland is a necessary fight where good (we) stands against evil 
(them). The acceptability of this moral fight was further enhanced through 
Wilder’s references to non-personal rather than personal categories, that is, to 
Islam as a system of belief rather than to Muslims as persons. 
A final aspect of (radical right) political discourse documented by previous 
social psychological research that I wish to highlight is the use of temporality 
– time past, present and future – as a discursive resource (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 
2014; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b, see also Condor, 2006, for an interview-
based study, conducted in the UK, of the use of temporality within lay people’s 
constructions of nationhood). In discursive constructions of a narrow, 
exclusive nation, the past may become an especially important argumentative 
tool: an era of ethnic homogeneity, when everything was ‘better’, is imagined 
and constructed in contrast to present immigration policies, and to future 
‘threatening’ scenarios of a multicultural society. Famous legends and myths 
ingrained in the collective memory of people can be used in order to 
(re)construct a sense of shared identity of ‘the people’ and the nation (Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001b). An example of such a myth is the Swedish folkhem, the 
people’s home, referring to the creation of the Swedish welfare system. This 
concept has frequently been depicted by populist radical right politicians as an 
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exclusive property of the Swedish people – one that would not endure an 
extension of this national category (e.g., Hellstöm, 2016; Norocel, 2016). In 
the Finnish context, Sakki and Cottier (2012) have shown how references to 
past traditions such as folk-music and national art, and to the courage of Finns 
in times of war have similarly been used in populist radical right election 
documents in order to construct an exclusionary category of the nation and its 
people. Indeed, radical right political discourse relying on the past is not 
seldom phrased in narratives of war, in which the self (the radical right 
politician) and his or her fight against multiculturalism is likened to national 
war-time heroes of the past and their battlefield-victories, as demonstrated for 
example in studies of the rhetoric of Belgian, French and Dutch radical right 
party leaders (Mols & Jetten, 2014) and of Austrian (Wodak & Forchtner, 
2014) and German radical right politicians (Posch, Stopfner, & Kienpointner, 
2013).  
Whereas radical right politicians thus tend to draw an image of a ‘glorious 
past’ when the nation was ‘ethnically homogenous’, references to the ‘decline 
of the welfare-state’ when aiming to appeal to nostalgic emotions is a rhetorical 
strategy typically deployed by the political left (Coontz, 1992). However, as 
Mols and Jetten’s (2014) study demonstrated, the precise type of nostalgia 
elicited by politicians is highly context-dependent. The empirical context of 
the present study, that of Finland and Sweden, differs from the previously 
studied ones in that large-scale immigration began so late that the countries’ 
welfare systems – the famous ‘Nordic model’ – were developed during a time 
when the countries’ populations were relatively homogeneous (Finseraas, 
2012). Moreover, support for the welfare systems among the Nordic 
populations is strong and occurs across the social and political spectrum 
(Jaeger, 2012; Pyrhönen, 2015). Research has, de facto, demonstrated that 
these historical and societal peculiarities are reflected in Finnish and Swedish 
populist radical right and nationalist political discourse: the preservation of 
the welfare state is a salient feature in the FP’s as well as the SD’s anti-
immigration political argumentation (Norocel, 2016; Nordensvard & Ketola, 
2014; Pyrhönen, 2015). In their study of election documents of the FP and SD 
during 2009 to 2012 Nordensvard and Ketola (2014) conclude that both 
parties link welfare with nationalism in their advocating of a ‘welfare nation 
state’ (p. 359), where welfare services should be provided to the national 
citizens only. However, according to the authors, whilst the FP locate the 
severest enemy of the ‘people’s welfare’ in the EU and its threat to Finland’s 
sovereignty, the SD view immigration and multiculturalism as its main foes. 
The present study is based upon and aims to contribute to the body of 
research outlined in this section. It also shares the emphasis of social 
psychological researchers of political discourse that if we are to understand the 
meanings that different concepts and categories acquire in this discourse, it 
needs to be examined as part of its surrounding argumentative context (Billig, 
1987; Hopkins et al., 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b; cf. section 3.4 below). 
Thus, this study endeavours through its comparative approach and its focus 
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on political articulations in the online sphere of the blogs to enhance our 
understanding of contemporary nationalist and populist radical right political 
discourse. It will explore how nationalist political appeals are constructed in 
the discourse contained in political blogs that are specifically aimed at voter 
persuasion and mobilisation (e.g., Nilsson & Carlsson, 2014). In so doing, it 
will be sensitive to the specificities of the Finnish-Swedish context, and to how 
these specificities may be reflected in the discourse.  
3.2 THE DIVERSITY OF VOICES WITHIN POPULIST 
RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES 
The studies outlined in the previous section predominantly focus on the anti-
immigration discourse of white men. This is not all too surprising, as populist 
and radical right parties remain heavily dominated by – white men. Matters 
are, however, slowly changing. Women have reached prominent positions in 
radical right parties, for example Siv Jensen of the PP in Norway and Pia 
Kjaersgaard of the DPP in Denmark. Susi Meret (2015) has shown how, in her 
rhetoric, the DPP leader Pia Kjærsgaard successfully combines elements of 
control, organisation and political savviness with more stereotypical notions 
of women as mothers and emotional beings. Further, most Europeans will 
recognise the face of one of the continent’s most powerful and successful 
contemporary political leaders, Marine Le Pen of the French radical right party 
FN. Le Pen has indeed been able to substantially increase her party’s 
popularity, not least among female voters (Felix, 2015), and has chances of 
winning the 2017 French presidential elections.  
Those who saw the 2014 parliamentary election campaign-video of the 
fiercely anti-immigration Sweden Democrats might have been surprised to see 
that the two main actors in the film were young non-white SD-members, who 
proclaimed the party’s anti-racist mission. The contrast to the party’s 
campaign film in the previous elections in 2010 – where ‘Swedes’ and Muslims 
were overtly positioned against each other, and which was banned because it 
was deemed to exhort to racist hatred (Larsson & Kallin, 2010) – captures the 
shift that has taken place in the SD’s public profile in the 21st century, a step 
along the path the party tries to trod in order to cleanse its image of racism 
(Rydgren, 2005). Starting from the 2010’s the party’s popularity among 
Swedes with immigrant background has indeed been steadily increasing and 
was at 8 per cent in May 2015 (Statistics Sweden, 2015), despite the fact that 
the party’s emphasis on cultural homogeneity and resistance to immigration 
remains firm. 
The aforementioned examples reveal that diversity is increasing within the 
populist radical right. A central aim of this dissertation is to delve further into 
this issue by exploring the worldviews of women and immigrants who have 
chosen to join a party that is hostile to both gender equality and cultural and 
ethnic diversity. Ultimately, the goal of this endeavour is to add something to 
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our understanding of the increasing popularity of the populist radical right 
among constituencies other than the stereotype of the white, working-class, 
rural male (cf. e.g., Pyrhönen, 2015). 
3.2.1 EXPLORING THE WORLDVIEW OF WOMEN WITHIN POPULIST 
RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES 
 
Research into nationalism has been criticised by feminist scholars for ignoring 
its gendered aspects. The critics have drawn attention to the multiple ways – 
abstract as well as concrete – in which women have been implicated in 
nationalism (McClintock, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 
1989). In an abstract sense, as symbols of national collectivities (e.g., ‘Mother 
Russia’, the ‘Finnish maiden’) women have been and are included in the 
discourses that construct ethnic or national categories. Concretely, in the role 
of mothers they serve as biological reproducers of national groups and as 
transmitters of cultural traditions. Also feminist historians have highlighted 
the gendered nature of militant nationalist ideologies, such as those of the 
Weimar Republic and Nazi-Germany (Bridenthal, Grossmann & Kaplan, 
1984). In nationalist struggles men are typically associated with the military, 
the active protector and fighter, whereas women serve as symbols of the civil, 
‘the motherland’, the protected (Howard & Prividera, 2004). 
White women’s bodies can thus become both the symbolic and the actual 
battlefields of nationalism: as symbols of an imagined ‘pure’ nation they need 
protection from external intruders, and a rape of one of ‘our’ women by a 
‘foreigner’ becomes interpreted as a charge against the entire nation 
(McClintock, 1995). At the same time, paradoxically, women may become the 
threat to and traitor of the ‘white nation’, as in radical right rhetorical 
juxtapositions of the anti-immigration, working class ‘common man’ against 
the ‘elitist’ female who supports multiculturalism (Keskinen, 2011). In her 
research into nationalist and anti-feminist discourse in the Finnish context, 
Suvi Keskinen (2013) coined the term ‘white border guard masculinities’ for 
such antagonisms where gender, race, ethnicity and class intersect, and where 
‘white men struggle to save the “white nation”, and the “civilized West”… 
[from] naïve white women whose misuse of power has led to both feminism 
“gone too far” and the decline of the “white nation”.’ (p. 231). 
How might we then conceive of women who cross and challenge these 
gendered boundaries of nationalism; who join the ‘white border guard 
masculinities’ in their quest? The worldview of women that choose, for 
example, to support or join nationalist and populist radical right parties 
remains an understudied topic. Yet, some progress in this regard has been 
made in recent years, perhaps due to the increasing influence of female 
politicians of the radical right, not least with regards to strengthening the 
parties’ popular appeal (Felix, 2015). Based on their extensive study 
comparing voting behaviour for the radical right across seven countries, Niels 
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Spierings and Andrej Zaslove (2015) argue that even though these parties 
maintain a stronger support among men, this gender gap has been 
overemphasised in the literature. Some studies indicate, perhaps surprisingly, 
that up to 40 per cent of the support for the radical right internationally comes 
from women (Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge & de Lange, 2015). Moreover, 
Spierings and Zaslove (2015) conclude that women and men seem to vote for 
the radical right for the same major reason: because they oppose immigration. 
Other scholars have, however, provided different reasons for why women and 
men are drawn to the radical right, including gender-related disparate political 
interests (Fontana, Sidler & Hardmeier, 2006), different levels of religiosity 
between women and men (Gidengil, Hennigar, Blais & Nevitte, 2005) and the 
masculine profile of radical right parties (Kimmel, 2007). In sum, it does seem, 
first, that the topic of women within the radical right deserves more attention, 
and, second, that any interpretations of what lies behind the ‘gender gap’ need 
to take into account the specificity of the context wherein the phenomenon is 
studied. 
Turning thus to the context of our present interest, in a rare study in which 
women in the SD were interviewed Diana Mulinari and Anders Neergaard 
conclude that the form of femininity that these women experience is ‘difficult 
to reconcile with the Swedish discourse on gender equality, rooted as it is in 
women’s equal participation in the labour market on the one hand, and 
double-income households on the other – a discourse that is central for 
women politicians in all Swedish parties from the left to right’ (2014, p. 46). 
Seen from a slightly different perspective, this societal discourse of gender 
equality seems equally hard to accommodate with the populist radical right 
ideological emphasis on the submission of women to the positions of wives and 
mothers at the cost of the dominance of men, the rightful heads of the family 
(cf. e.g., Mulinari & Neergaard, 2010, p. 56–57; Stevens, 1999, p. 143–148). 
Given that women in the Northern European context of Finland and Sweden 
hold a more emancipated position in comparison with, for example, South 
American cultures (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015), this context is an 
exceptionally fruitful one for exploring how women within the populist radical 
right reconcile issues of gender equality with such a patriarchal political 
ideology. Thus, I am in this dissertation asking how female politicians within 
populist radical right parties negotiate the contradictory position of being a 
woman in a party that stands for white male heterosexual privilege and 
cherishes traditional gender roles (De los Reyes et al., 2003; Fekete, 2006), 
yet simultaneously in a time and place where gender equality has become 
‘common place’ (Billig, 1987; Holli, 2001) – that is, in a Nordic country. Might 
tensions between these two contradicting ideologies appear in the female 
populist radical right politicians’ discourse, and if so, how are these tensions 
discursively negotiated? 
The social psychological realms of critical discursive (e.g., Edley, 2001) and 
rhetorical psychology (e.g., Billig, 1987) provide means for attempting to 
answer the aforementioned questions. More specifically, the questions may be 
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approached through the concept of ideological dilemmas: ‘contrary themes of 
social knowledge … revealed in everyday discourse’ (Billig et al., 1988: 21). 
Michael Billig, the father of rhetorical psychology, drew a distinction between 
what resembles a Marxist understanding of an intellectual, dominating ‘elite’ 
kind of ideology, on the one hand, and a lived ideology, on the other (cf. Edley, 
2001). The concept of lived ideology bears close resemblance to the notions of 
‘common-sense’ or ‘culture’, and is, as opposed to intellectual ideology, 
inherently ambiguous in nature. This ambiguity is evident already when we 
look at expressions such as ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’ on the one hand, 
and ‘many hands make light work’ on the other. It seems that every rule and 
wisdom brings with it an equally convincing counter-wisdom. In our everyday 
lives we are constantly negotiating such contradictory pieces of social 
knowledge, which can then appear in our discourse and actions in the form of 
ideological dilemmas. This holds true, for instance, for the teacher who tries 
to strike a balance between authoritarian and democratic teaching styles, or 
for the ‘modern parent’, who struggles to allocate his or her time wisely 
between work and family. So might, I argue, tensions between norms of gender 
equality and a patriarchal political ideology appear in the discourse of female 
populist radical right politicians. I will return to this argument in section 5.2.1 
below. For now, I will let it lead me to the second, equally conspicuous tension 
that this dissertation sets out to explore: that of being an immigrant in an anti-
immigration political party. 
3.2.2 CONSTRUCTIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN POPULIST RADICAL 
RIGHT DISCOURSE 
 
Why do persons with immigrant or ethnic minority belonging choose to join 
an anti-immigrant political party? How do they come to terms with this 
contradictory position? Posing such questions may sadly not take the 
researcher far, as their answers will certainly be complex and depend on any 
individual politician’s personal history and experiences. Alternatively, 
however, one might seek to approach this intriguing topic from the perspective 
of identities, and, more precisely, from the perspective of how individuals may 
accommodate multiple (more or less compatible) identities within the self – 
an area in which social psychological research has insights and analytical tools 
to offer. The aforementioned questions may then become rephrased into: how 
do populist radical right politicians discursively account for their ethnic 
minority belonging in relation to their anti-immigration political affiliation? 
Difficulties do not end here, however, since the mere quest of trying to 
agree upon a definition of what constitutes an ‘ethnic’ identity has caused 
social scientists a headache for decades. Max Weber (1968) conceptualized an 
ethnic group as characterized by a belief in a common origin and ancestry, 
which enables a sense of community and belonging. The belief in such a 
common origin is thus a way of distinguishing what we can call an ethnic 
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identity from other social identities, that is, our sense of who we are based on 
our group memberships such as gender or class (Tajfel, 1978; Talfel & Turner, 
1979). Asking where this identity derives from brings us to another long-
lasting dispute about ethnic identity: should it be regarded at the level of 
structure or agency (Verkuyten, 2005)? In other words, should one take 
society as one’s starting point, and conceive of ethnic identity as something 
that individuals acquire from the cultural, political and ideological context that 
surrounds them? Or should one rather flip the coin and approach the concept 
from an individualistic perspective that would examine ethnic identity as an 
accomplishment of individual choices and assertions?  
Scholars such as Maykel Verkuyten (2005) and Charles Westin (2010) have 
argued that neither of these approaches is able to grasp the complex character 
of ethnic identity. Rather, if we are to gain a better understanding of the 
richness of the concept, we need to combine different social psychological 
approaches, despite their ontological and epistemological differences and 
disparate empirical interests. Inspired by this thought, my approach in this 
dissertation is one that remains sensitive to the implications that shared 
discourses and meanings at the societal level have on individuals’ ethnic 
identity, yet one that does not abandon the notion that individuals have agency 
with respect to how they identify in ethnic terms. Social psychological research 
has indeed highlighted that individuals have various optional – ethnic or other 
– identities available to them that they may focus on, depending both on the 
prominence of any certain identity, as well as on the particular social context 
(Verkuyten, 2005). One may feel like a teacher at work, like a wife at home, 
and like a devoted feminist in discussions with friends and acquaintances. This 
variability and flexibility of identities does not imply that people cannot or 
would not develop deeper, more enduring senses of who they are (Verkuyten, 
2005). Rather, and bearing in mind Weber’s phrasing ‘belief’ in a common 
origin, this interpretation allows us to conclude that like other social identities 
ethnic identities are flexible, relational and situational, and not absolute or 
‘natural’ categories (e.g., Condor, 2000; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; 
Liebkind, Mähönen, Varjonen & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015; Reicher, 2001).  
However, not all social identities are equally easy for the individual to 
reconcile. How do, for example, populist radical right politicians with 
immigrant or other ethnic minority background categorise themselves in 
ethnic terms? Social psychological research tells us that these politicians do 
have various options in this regard, and can construct for themselves both 
insider and outsider positions in relation to more than one ethnic group 
(Liebkind et. al, 2015). They may, for example, categorise themselves at a 
superordinate level (Hornsey & Hogg, 2002), accept their minority group 
membership at a superficial level but experience it with discomfort 
(Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2001), maintain their ethnic minority self-definition 
whilst adopting the majority culture (Liebkind, 2001), ‘subtype’ the self into a 
favourable subcategory within the minority group (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 
2003), or try to leave the group for an alternative, more attractive one 
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(Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). We cannot know which choices these 
politicians prefer, or whether they consider such choices relevant in the first 
place. By analysing their blog accounts we may, however, gain insight into how 
these politicians deal with their multiple – converging or contradictory – 
identities; how they construct these identities based on the various ethnic, 
political, cultural, and ideological alternatives that are available to them; and 
what consequences such identity-constructions may have in a social and 
political sense. Indeed, in their analyses of Scottish politicians’ discourse about 
the nation, Reicher and Hopkins (2001b), from the perspective of social 
categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), have shown that in such discourse 
national identity is not merely a matter of being, but a matter of becoming that 
may be used effectively in order to achieve particular social and political 
outcomes. Specifically, shifting the boundaries between different social 
categories, and strategically placing oneself within certain (such as the 
‘Scottish’ or ‘Swedish’) ones and outside of others, are powerful means 
whereby politicians may come across as representatives of ‘the national 
community’, and mobilise action for nationalist causes. 
In the present study I will approach the intricacy of ethnic identity 
constructions from a critical discursive perspective. Discursive research on 
ethnic identity constructions has been able to show that their socially 
negotiated and situated, and multi-layered and complex character is 
discernible from this perspective as well (Merino & Tileagă, 2011; Sala, Dandy 
& Rapley, 2010; Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002; Yamaguchi, 2005). Oftentimes, 
ethnic minority members have access to both the majority (usually the ‘host’ 
population) and minority (immigrant or other) groups, which means that 
ethnic minority identities can be given meaning not only in relation to the 
majority group, but also through comparisons to members of the ethnic 
ingroup (Sala et al., 2010).  
Ethnic self-definitions can, furthermore, occur at different levels of 
identification: they can emerge from categorisations offered or imposed by 
others, but they can also be actively constructed and claimed by individuals 
themselves. These two levels of identification that Mitch Berbrier has called 
assigned and asserted (Berbrier, 2008) can co-exist, and complement as well 
as contradict each other. Verkuyten and de Wolf (2002) have explored this 
empirically in the Dutch context, demonstrating how ethnic Chinese 
participants drew upon various discursive resources, such as physical 
appearance, early socialisation, and the possession of critical attributes in 
order to construct their identities at the distinct yet related levels of being, 
feeling and doing Chinese. These ethnic self-definitions were constructed 
through a conglomerate of notions of determinism versus personal agency, 
continuity versus change, and tensions between solidarity towards and 
differentiation from the ethnic minority group. In a similar vein, Merino and 
Tileagă’s (2011) study of members of the Mapuche population in Chile 
demonstrated how the participants drew upon practical and common-sense 
reasoning in order to claim, negotiate and resist certain ethnic identities. The 
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interviewees distinguished between knowing about their shallower, ascribed 
ethnic identities, and feeling a deeper sense of personal belonging to an ethnic 
group. Together, these studies emphasize that ethnic identity is not simply 
something that is given to people by nature or nurture, but also something that 
people actively seek in social interaction. 
Building upon the line of discursive research on ethnic identities described 
above, and informed by Reicher and Hopkins (2001b) research into shifting 
national identities in political discourse3, I wish in this study to enhance our 
understanding of how populist radical right politicians with immigrant or 
other ethnic minority background construct and accommodate their 
(compatible as well as conflicting) identities within their discourse. In contrast 
to the aforementioned studies on discursive constructions of ethnic identity 
the present one does not explore this topic in the context of individual or group 
interviews, which, given their interactive format and the active role of the 
researcher, in a way presuppose negotiations of identity constructs (cf. Potter 
& Hepburn, 2005). This study also differs from the discussed ones in the 
important way that an apparent conflict exists between the bloggers’ labels as 
‘immigrants’ and their position in an anti-immigration party. My interest lies, 
thus, in exploring whether this conflict appears in the discourse of the populist 
radical right politicians with immigrant and other ethnic minority 
background, and if so, how this conflict might be resolved in individually 
written blog-entries. 
In terms of the analytical toolkit of critical discursive psychology, I set out 
to explore how the bloggers construct their subject positions (Davies & Harré, 
1990; Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell, 1998), which in Edley’s 
(2001, pg. 210) words ‘…connect[s] the wider notions of discourses and 
interpretative repertoires to the social construction of particular selves’, based 
on their identification with a multitude of ethnic, cultural, political and other 
social categories. I see subject positions not as roles, fixed states or 
personhoods, but as the locations or identities that speakers claim in their talk 
and text. I remain conscious of the malleability of these identities; in other 
words, I do not assume that a person can claim only one subject position for 
him- or herself in any given situation. Thus, I aim to study how the subject 
positions of the bloggers might vary in conjunction with the particular 
discursive context in which these positions appear, and, importantly in the 
case of political discourse, in accordance with the rhetorical aims of the 
individual blogger.  
                                                 
3 Reicher and Hopkins’ (2001b) highly influential book Self and nation explores nationalist political 
discourse taking social categorisation theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) as its main theoretical standpoint. 
In other words, unlike that of the present study, the approach of Reicher and Hopkins is not a social 
constructionist one. Nevertheless, these two studies both have as their central interest how people 
position themselves within various social (ethnic or other) categories in political discourse, and on the 
action-orientation of such positionings (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b, p. 151), that is, on what the 
positionings may accomplish in a social and political sense. 
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3.3 THE PECULIARITIES OF POLITICAL BLOGGING  
Apart from the focus on the perspective of white men, most of the research on 
radical right discourse described in section 3.1 above has concentrated on 
traditional media, such as newspaper articles (e.g., Verkuyten, 2013) and 
official party websites (e.g., Atton, 2006), as well as on political debates (e.g., 
van der Valk, 2003), speeches (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2014) and leaflets 
(Goodman & Johnson, 2014). Discourse and conversation analytical 
researchers have, however, recently started paying attention to (political) 
discourse within the Internet-based social media, such as Facebook (e.g, Burke 
& Goodman, 2012), and have begun to develop research methods in order to 
study this ‘new’ public space (e.g, Giles, Stommel, Paulus, Lester & Reed, 2015; 
Morison, Gibson, Wigginton & Crabb, 2015; Jowett, 2015). Yet, an area that 
has remained without much attention from discursive researchers is political 
blogging as a tool for expressing radical right, nationalist and anti-
immigration political views. This may seem quite surprising in light of the fact 
that research in the field of online political communication has demonstrated 
that political blogs have become a novel form of public sphere, one that with 
its particular digital and communicative features allows politicians to convey 
their messages in different discursive ways than traditional media channels do 
(Cammaerts, 2009; Silva, 2016). Such an alternative public sphere may be 
especially important for marginalized groups, for instance for politicians who 
are not given the attention within mainstream media that they would wish for. 
This pertains both to the FP and SD before their national electoral 
breakthroughs (2011 and 2010), and remains very much the case for the SD, 
whom Swedish mainstream media still try hard to debar (Hatakka et al., 2017; 
Hellström, 2016). 
Importantly, moreover, research suggests that politicians are motivated to 
use blogs for the sake of influencing the political debate (Farrell & Drezner, 
2008). Blogs often contain the possibility for the readers to comment upon the 
blogger’s entries, an element that enables a discussion to emerge between the 
blogger and his or her readership. Because of such interactive and 
collaborative features that allow the readers to communicate directly with the 
blogging politician, blogs can serve as a platform for political participation and 
debate (Baumer et al., 2011). In this sense, blogs create significant 
opportunities for political mobilisation (Nilsson & Carlsson, 2014).  
The discovery that blogs along with other forms of new and social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter encourage their consumers to actively 
participate in political discussions has prompted researchers to acknowledge 
the democratic value of such media (cf. Lanlois, Elmer, McKelvey, et al., 2009; 
Loader & Mercea, 2011). Nevertheless, this democratic coin has a flipside to it: 
the development of the social media has rendered the public sphere ever more 
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divided between internally likeminded groups, a development that can inhibit 
open debate (e.g., Carpentier, 2011). Blogs and other forms of social media 
may also be used for anti-social purposes, such as threats and hate-speech 
(Cammaerts, 2008); and, on the other hand, political dissidents who blog run 
the risk of being silenced or punished by those in rule (Morozov, 2011).  
A further issue of concern is that blogs, in circumventing the 
intermediating role played by journalists, not only empower their users, that 
is, the citizens (Loader & Mercea, 2011), but may also function as a channel for 
politicians across the political spectrum to control and manipulate the 
messages that are being conveyed (O’Neill, 2010). Finally, and of special 
relevance for the present study, blogs can serve as a platform for producing 
pronounced populist identities that rely on dichotomies between ‘us’ (e.g., the 
blogger and ‘the people’) and ‘them’ (e.g., the ‘elite’) (cf. Nilsson, 2012). 
Discursive research into online political communication shows some 
support for the notion that this communication is more extreme (e.g., Billig, 
2001; Burke & Goodman, 2012; Goodman, 2007) than its ‘offline’ counterpart. 
These findings may be at least partly explained, on the one hand, by the 
likelihood that individuals holding stronger views are those that are most 
active in online debates, and, on the other hand, by the possibility of 
maintaining a large degree of anonymity and thus having less at stake in the 
online sphere (e.g., Burke & Goodman, 2012). Matters are different within the 
political blogosphere, however, where the identity of the blogging politician is 
intentionally and clearly disclosed. Furthermore, arguments in political blogs 
can be constructed not merely through ‘traditional’ political rhetoric, but 
through an intricate intermingling of verbal, digital, visual and communicative 
features that jointly construct the arguments (Baumer et al., 2011; Silva 2016). 
Research shows that blogs have come to constitute a uniqe kind of online 
sphere that seems especially fruitful for bringing together groups of 
‘likeminded’: political blogs are often connected to each other through 
hyperlinks, and such webs of blogs can then develop their own norms of how 
information is distributed (Coddington, 2014). 
The present study takes as its point of departure research that has hinted 
towards the growing importance of social media in the transmission of radical 
right and nationalist political discourse (e.g., Allen, 2011; Bratten, 2005). This 
phenomenon is especially interesting to study in the context of Finland and 
Sweden, where the electoral fortunes of the radical right in the 21st century 
was greatly advanced by such media (Hatakka, 2016; Horsti, 2015; Keskinen, 
2013). Further, Finland and Sweden occupy the top positions in international 
comparison in terms of Internet and social media penetration (Karlsson & 
Åström, 2014; Strandberg, 2013); thus, political blogs are particularly widely 
and actively consumed in both countries. My present interest lies in how 
political blogs may function as a particular – indeed as a particularly 
advantageous – sphere for populist radical right and nationalist political 
discourse.  
The social psychology of radical right discourse 
42 
It would be a false assumption, however, that the discourse contained in 
the ‘alternative’ sphere of political blogs remains in that sphere. Rather, 
because also journalists seek information from political blogs, the entries in 
any one blog reach far beyond the limits of its unique readership. Thus, blog-
writings may well, and do, have an impact on mainstream media and thus on 
a broader public (Baumer et al., 2011; Ekdale, Namkoong, Fung & Perlmutter, 
2010; Farrell & Drezner, 2008). As for radical right, nationalist and also racist 
political discourse, blogs constitute an important stepping-stone from which 
this discourse slowly but certainly becomes normalised in societal and political 
debates (Lentin & Titley, 2011; Maasilta, 2011; Mäkinen, 2016). 
In focusing on discourse contained in populist radical right political blogs, 
one central aim of my research is to widen the range of data sources that we 
rely on for furthering our social psychological knowledge. As noted, even 
though we are conscious of the importance of blogs for political 
communication and mobilisation, there is a shortage of qualitative, discursive 
research exploring how the particular features of blogs are exploited for 
politically persuasive aims. This may be precisely due to the barriers involved 
in grasping and transcribing into analysable material the multitude of verbal, 
digital, communicative and (audio-)visual components in a political blog.  A 
further central endeavour of this study is thus to fill this methodological gap 
in qualitative social psychological research by demonstrating how an analysis 
that goes ‘beyond the text’ contained in political blogs may be conducted. More 
specifically, I will argue in favour of a methodological approach that relies on 
critical discursive and rhetorical psychology, yet that also integrates analytical 
procedures from narrative psychology as well as visual studies and studies on 
online political communication (see section 3.4 below). The crucial benefit of 
such an approach, I will assert, is that it is able to grasp the patchwork of 
verbal, digital, visual and communicative components that characterises 
discourse contained in political blogs. My hope is that this approach allows us 
to improve our ability to analyse political blog-discourse, thereby advancing 
social psychological research on contemporary political communication and 
persuasion more generally. Next, I will outline in more detail the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions that guide the present study. 
3.4 A CRITICAL DISCURSIVE AND RHETORICAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON POPULIST 
RADICAL RIGHT POLITICAL BLOGS  
My main mission in this study is to explore the discourse contained in political 
blogs of populist radical right politicians, and to elaborate on the societal 
implications this discourse might have. I have chosen to do so by relying on 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions that derive from the 
multidisciplinary field of social constructionism (e.g., Burr, 2003; Gergen, 
2009) that conceives of reality as continuously constructed by human beings 
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in social practices. Within social psychology social constructionism was born 
as part of the ‘linguistic turn’ of the discipline in the 1970s and 80s. It 
constituted a critique against the experimental research design that 
dominated the field and, according to social constructionists, in removing her 
from her social, historical and cultural context held too mechanistic and 
simplistic a view the human being (Gergen, 1973; 2009). Social 
constructionists also opposed the positivist conviction of the existence of any 
stable and absolute truth and knowledge that is ‘out there’, as well as the 
emphasis that was put on internal, cognitive processes of the human mind. By 
contrast, social constructionists maintained that what we call ‘truth’ and 
‘knowledge’ are productions of historically and socio-culturally rooted shared 
meanings and practices. 
The social constructionist school has given birth to a number of research 
perspectives within social psychology, such as critical social psychology (e.g., 
Hepburn, 2003), social representation theory (Moscovici, 1961/2008; 1984), 
some perspectives of narrative psychology (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1988), as 
well as the aforementioned realms of rhetorical psychology (Billig, e.g., 1987; 
1988a; 1991), and discursive (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and critical 
discursive psychology (CDP; Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell, 
1998). From all these perspectives, discourse is conceived of not as mere 
language, but as systems of meaning that are constructed through social 
practices and that at the same time construct social reality (Jokinen, Juhila & 
Suoninen, 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). In the present study, taking a 
critical discursive and rhetorical psychological perspective, I thus do not 
assume that discourse is a reflection of people’s ‘true’ inner selves, attitudes or 
thoughts. This does not imply that I deny that people have thoughts about 
themselves and the world around them. Rather, following Michael Billig 
(1987), I see people’s arguing and thinking as inseparable from each other. 
This also means that I focus on the action-orientation and functionality of 
discourse (Billig, 1987; Edley, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), or, put 
differently, on what discourse may accomplish in a social and political sense. I 
focus on ‘language in use’ (Taylor, 2001, p. 6, emphasis added), that is, I am 
interested in how meaning is constructed, transmitted, and socially 
accomplished through (political) discourse.  
A critical discursive psychological approach conceives of discourse as 
having a dual character: on the one hand, it enables and constrains individuals’ 
actions, yet, the approach contends, it is also through discourse that 
individuals may achieve particular social outcomes. I argue that such an 
approach is particularly fruitful for studying political discourse, as it allows the 
researcher to explore the ways that historical and ideological matters are 
reflected in and shape the discourse, and also to elaborate on the social and 
political outcomes that this socially situated discourse may achieve. It enables 
the researcher to focus on the politicians’ constructions of their social reality, 
and specifically in this dissertation, on the constructions of the nation that they 
offer to the electorate. 
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Yet, and as we will see more fully later on, blog-discourse consists of much 
more than verbal constructions. Thus, in this dissertation I extend my 
comprehension of the term discourse beyond the scope of written text in order 
to examine how meaning may be constructed and conveyed also through 
(audio-)visual and digital modes of communication. Study IV focuses 
specifically on developing a methodological approach that renders it possible 
to explore all of these elements from a critical social psychological perspective. 
The approach I propose in this study relies heavily on critical discursive and 
rhetorical psychological assumptions, yet it includes analytical procedures 
from the social semiotic studies of images (e.g., Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), 
and also incorporates sensitivity of the narrative structure (e.g., Gergen & 
Gergen, 1988) and the digital and communicative elements of political blog-
discourse. Such a multi-disciplinary approach allows the researcher to explore 
the multi-faceted scope of blog-discourse: to see how political arguments may 
be delivered in the form of emotionally engaging stories or narratives; through 
vivid, powerful imagery; through hyperlinks that distance the blogger from the 
argument he or she is delivering; or through collaborative elements whereby 
the arguments become constructed in a dialogue between the blogger and the 
readers. 
Combining critical discursive and rhetorical perspectives with social 
semiotic and narrative psychological ones is not without difficulties: the 
aforementioned two perspectives position themselves as social 
constructionist, whereas the latter ones to a larger extent focus also on 
cognitive, ‘inner’ psychological processes. Nevertheless, a social semiotic 
approach does conceive of images as being constructions of culturally shared 
resources, and explores how images may be used in order to serve particular 
functions (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001). The same holds true for the narrative 
psychological approaches adopted in this study, where the focus is upon the 
socially embedded and constructive character of narratives (e.g., Bruner, 1991; 
Gergen & Gergen, 1988). Finally, and crucially, all these approaches take a 
critical scientific stance: they strive to unpack the seemingly neutral and 
common-sensical contents of verbal, visual and digital constructions, and to 
highlight how such constructions can function in order to advocate certain 
values or power structures, and undermine others (e.g., Edley, 2001; Penn, 
2010). Thus, despite differences in epistemological assumptions, I shall argue 
that the approaches nevertheless share important underpinnings that allow 
them to be purposefully combined for the study of multi-layered (nationalist) 
blog-discourse. 
This doctoral dissertation situates itself at the crossroads of research on 
radical right and nationalist political discourse, feminist research into 
gendered aspects of nationalism, discursive research on constructions of 
ethnic identity, and research on online political communication. As described 
above, in approaching the topic of populist radical right political blogging I 
rely methodologically mainly on the perspective of critical discursive 
psychology, CDP. CDP is one of many critical discourse analytical approaches 
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that have been utilised for studying political discourse, such as the critical 
discourse analytical approaches (CDA) developed by Norman and Isabela 
Fairclough (e.g., Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) and Teun van Dijk (e.g., van 
Dijk, 1993b). The present research is, certainly, informed by insights from 
these discourse analytical perspectives as well (e.g., Fairclough and 
Fairclough’s (2012) work on practical reasoning in political argumentation, 
and van Dijk’s (1993a) research on the denial and reversal of racism). Yet, 
whilst all these approaches have much in common with regards to their focus 
on the social and political situatedness and constructive nature and rhetorical 
organisation of discourse, they also differ from each other in terms of their 
perspectives and assumptions. Fairclough’s and Fairclough’s CDA, to my 
understanding, emphasises the critical evaluation of political arguments – are 
they sustainable to critical questioning or not? Further, like the approach of 
van Dijk, it does not shy away from making distinctions between external and 
internal psychological processes.  
I will return to a reflection about the difficulties of separating different 
critical discursive approaches from each other in section 6.2 below. At present, 
however, I will argue that in comparison with the aforementioned CDA 
approaches CDP puts a stronger emphasis on the social construction of 
(political) discourse, and is neither interested in potential cognitive motives 
behind political argumentation, nor in its logical soundness. Rather, CDP 
combines macro- with micro-perspectives on discourse, exploring it as part of 
its broader social and historical context, yet also at the level of immediate 
social interaction. Consequently, I found CDP especially compatible with my 
research interests in how the discourse in populist radical right political blogs 
becomes co-constructed by the politician and his or her readership; in the 
socially and culturally rooted and rhetorical character of this discourse; and, 
finally, in the potential (immediate) social and (broader) political functions of 
the discourse.  
Following Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (1987) I thus view 
(political) discourse as socially situated and functional; in other words, I view 
the individual politicians, as well as the specific social and political context 
they act in as important players in the construction of this discourse, yet at the 
same time I abide by the idea that the discourse itself constructs that very 
social world (Edley, 2001). In terms of my interest in nationalist political 
discourse, I will not attempt to make sense of what accounts of the nation are 
‘true’ as opposed to ‘false’, but rather, following Reicher and Hopkins (2001a, 
p. 20) I wish to explore how ‘any version of the national past and of national 
identity serves contemporary interests’. That is, my aim is to study how 
different versions of nationalism are constructed in the blog accounts, how 
important the role of social psychological phenomena – such as self-
presentation, identity-constructions, discursive divisions between ‘ingroups’ 
and ‘outgroups’, persuasion and appeals to emotions and nostalgic memories 
– are in these constructions; and how these constructions function to serve the 
purposes of populist radical right political projects. 
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My research approach is purely qualitative, which implies that I have no 
ambitions to generalise my findings in a way that a larger quantitative study 
would. Rather, what I wish to do is to provide analytical insights into the 
peculiarities of populist radical right and nationalist political blogging, and to 
elaborate on its social and political consequences (that may, as I shall discuss 
in section 6.1 below, indeed have a general character).  
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to explore how blogs can be used 
as tools for nationalist political communication and persuasion. The other, 
more specific aims of this research project can be phrased in the following 
research questions: 
 
 
1. What social and political functions may nationalist discourse in political 
blogs serve? (Studies I, II, III, IV) 
 
2. How is Otherness constructed within anti-immigration discourse in 
populist radical right political blogs? (Study I) 
 
3. How do female populist radical right politicians negotiate the tension 
between norms of gender equality and a patriarchal political ideology? 
(Study II) 
 
4. How do populist radical right politicians with immigrant or other ethnic 
minority background discursively construct their ethnic identities? 
(Study III) 
 
5. How can social psychological research grasp the multitude of elements 
involved in the construction of messages contained in political blogs? 
(Study IV) 
 
In chapter 5, where I present the main findings of the four sub-studies, I 
will respond to each of the five questions presented above, bearing the afore-
mentioned overarching aim in mind throughout the chapter. I summarize and 
evaluate the results, and elaborate further upon their theoretical, empirical 
and practical implications in the discussion in chapter 6. In the next chapter, 
however, I will first describe the research material and methods of analysis in 
more detail.  
 47 
4 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
4.1 MATERIAL 
This dissertation consists of four separate sub-studies. Study II was single-
authored by myself. Studies I an IV were authored by Inari Sakki and myself, 
and study III by Karmela Liebkind, Inari Sakki and myself. Thus, from now on 
I shall use ‘I’ when referring to the author of study II, and ‘we’ when referring 
to the authors of studies I, III and IV.4  
The material for this research project consists of entries from political blogs 
by members of the FP and the SD. The material, in contrast for instance to 
interview material, is what Potter and Hepburn (2005) would call 
‘naturalistic’. There are a number of advantages with using such material for 
the purposes of the present research project. Potter and Hepburn (2005) 
identify several – amendable as well as unavoidable – problems related to 
using interviews in qualitative research. For example, the authors highlight 
how the interactional character of the research setting, the interests and stake 
of the interviewer, and the shifting positions or footings (Goffman, 1981) of 
both the interviewer and interviewee have implications for how the interview 
proceeds and thus for the analytical conclusions that may be drawn from the 
material. Without questioning the value of interview-based qualitative 
research I wish to emphasise that such aspects are especially important to 
consider when the potential interviewees are radical right politicians, as in the 
present study. Indeed, in analysing the politicians’ independently authored 
blog-entries, rather than interviews planned and carried out by myself, I have 
been able to avoid imposing my own interests and expectations on the 
politicians, and instead focus on discourse that they produce without my 
involvement, that is, on discourse that occurs ‘naturally’. This is not to say, 
however, that my research interests are not reflected in my research questions 
and analytical interpretations – they certainly are. Yet, my choice of material 
removes the risk of me directly steering the politicians to respond to specific 
questions raised by me as a specific category-member, for example, as a 
researcher. I will return to a reflection on the benefits and limitations of using 
blog-material in section 6.2 below.   
Each of the sub-studies in this dissertation focuses on different sets of 
material that were collected based upon the study-specific research questions 
                                                 
4 A simpler solution would have been for me to present the analyses in passive voice. The use of passive 
voice is, however, not recommended by the American Psychological Association (2009, p. 77), and it is 
especially unsuitable for presenting (critical) discursive research, where the role of the researcher and 
his or her subjectivity is especially central throughout the research process. Thus, despite it being 
uncommon practice to do so, I have chosen to use both ’I’ and ’we’ in this dissertation, hoping thereby 
not to confuse the reader excessively. 
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outlined in the previous section (3.4). All blog-entries were written between 
the years 2007 and 2015, a period that captures the time preceding and 
following the national electoral successes of the SD (2010) and the FP (2011), 
as well as the European ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015. After having analysed the blog-
entries, I – being a native speaker of Swedish and fluent in Finnish – translated 
them from their original language (Finnish or Swedish) into English. In so 
doing, I strived to retain idiomatic expressions and linguistic idiosyncrasies as 
much as possible, and explained their meaning in English where necessary 
(e.g., the expression ‘lady in a flowery hat’, ‘kukkahattutäti’, on p. 47 below). 
The material of the separate sub-studies are summarized in Table 1 below5. 
4.1.1 STUDY I: BLOGS OF EXTREME ANTI-IMMGRATION 
POLITICIANS 
 
The material for Study I derives from nine blogs written by politicians who met 
the criteria of, first, having publicly proclaimed a strong anti-immigration 
stance, and second, being members of the national parliament and thus in a 
position of significant power and societal influence in their respective 
countries. At the time of data-collection (2013-2014) four FP and five SD-
members fulfilled these criteria. The four Finnish bloggers (James Hirvisaari6, 
Olli Immonen, Jussi Halla-aho and Juho Eerola) had signed the anti-
immigration manifesto Nuiva vaalimanifesti7 and held backgrounds in the 
extreme nationalist group called Suomen Sisu (‘Finnish Determination’); two 
of them have been convicted of hate-speech (Sundqvist, 2012). Halla-aho is 
considered the ideological leader of the Finnish radical right and anti-
immigration movement, and has also been quoted on the web pages of 
international counter-jihadists.  
All five Swedish bloggers (Markus Wiechel, Richard Jomshof, Thoralf 
Alfsson8, Kent Ekeroth and Mattias Karlsson) had attracted attention in the 
public debate for their aggressive criticism of Islam, and two of them had been 
accused of hate-speech (Barr, 2013). One of the five, Mattias Karlsson, has 
                                                 
5 The blog-entries varied significantly in terms of their length and style: whilst together amounting to 
some hundreds of pages, some entries were very short, containing one or two sentences or links, while 
others were long essay-like entries. Calculating and reporting the exact number of blog-entries thus says 
little about their content and width. Instead, the number of studied blogs provides a better 
understanding of the scope of the material. 
6 As a consequence of the so-called Nazi salute scandal, which took place in October 2013 in the Finnish 
Parliament, Hirvisaari was expelled from the FP, yet he retained his seat in parliament as a member of 
the parliamentary group Change 2011. 
7 At the time of writing (October 2016) the list of names of those who have signed the manifesto is no 
longer available online. 
8 Thoralf Alfsson was not among the SD’s candidates for the 2014 parliamentary elections, yet retains 
his place in the local council of Kalmar. 
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hugely influenced the ideological development of the SD, having acted as the 
party’s deputy leader in 2014-2015 (Sköld & Eriksson, 2014), and having been 
in charge of formulating, for example, the party’s 2011 programme of 
principles (Widfeldt, 2015). The specific blog-entries selected for analysis in 
this study were based on the topics of discussion – either immigration, 
multiculturalism or Islam – and the time of writing, namely 2008 to 2013. 
4.1.2 STUDY II: BLOGS OF FEMALE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT 
POLITICIANS 
 
I collected the material for Study II from blogs of three female SD and FP 
politicians, respectively. I chose the bloggers on the bases that they possessed 
considerable political influence (either as MP’s or members of the party 
executive) and that they were active bloggers. The Swedish bloggers were 
Paula Bieler, MP and member of the party executive; Carina Herrstedt, MP 
and vice president of the SD; and Therese Borg, member of the party executive. 
The Finnish bloggers were Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo, party secretary; Maria 
Lohela, MP9; and Laura Huhtasaari, MP. Thus, at the time when the study was 
conducted, the female SD and FP politicians whose discourse I examined held 
corresponding positions of power in their respective parties. The criteria for 
the selection of texts for this study were that the topics of discussion were 
related to gender and femininity – discussing gender equality, feminism, 
sexual minority rights and the position and rights of women – and the time of 
writing (2007 to 2014).  
4.1.3 STUDY III: BLOGS OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT POLITICIANS 
WITH IMMIGRANT OR OTHER ETHNIC MINORITY 
BACKGROUND 
 
The discourse examined in Study III is of politicians who met the criteria, first, 
of being of immigrant or other ethnic minority background, and second, of 
being active bloggers at the time of data collection. We were unable to find any 
FP-politicians fulfilling these criteria (see section 6.2 below for a discussion of 
this limitation), yet we found four SD-politicians that did. The first was MP 
Paula Bieler (also included in Study II) whose parents were Polish immigrants 
to Sweden. The second was Nima Gholam Ali Pour10, a local SD-politician who 
came to Sweden as an Iranian refugee at the age of six. The third blogger was 
Camilla Jonasson11, who during the conducting of the study (2015) was active 
                                                 
9 In 2015 Maria Lohela became Speaker of the Finnish parliament. 
10 Nima Gholam Ali Pour’s blog had been removed in the autumn 2015. However, his blog writings have 
been transferred to sites such as Samtiden.nu and lab.exponerat.net. 
11 In July 2015, Camilla Jonasson resigned from her activities in the SD. 
Material and Methods 
50 
in the board of the SD’s youth organisation and one of the actors in the party’s 
2014 campaign film. She was adopted from South Korea as a child. The fourth 
blogger was Ilona Michalowski, a local SD-politician who was born in 
Kazakhstan in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to Sweden from 
Ukraine as an adult. Our aim was to analyse the entries where the bloggers 
discussed their ethnic identity in connection to their political affiliation and 
the political debate on immigration in Sweden. We identified the accounts 
relating to this topic by searching for keywords such as immigration, 
immigration politics, immigrant, ethnic minority, Sweden Democrat(s), 
Swede and Swedish. All blog-entries were written between 2010 and 2014, 
covering the time during which both of the disputed parliamentary campaign-
films of the SD were launched (see section 3.2 above). 
4.1.4 STUDY IV: TWO NATIONALIST POLITICAL BLOG-ENTRIES  
 
In order to realize the methodological endeavour of Study IV – to propose how 
the multifaceted and also non-verbal political messages in blogs may be 
analysed – we here chose to focus on a small set of material, but one that was 
nevertheless rich in terms of the complexity of its discourse. We chose the 
material based on the following criteria. We wished, first, to study nationalist 
political appeals during a time of societal and political rupture, thus, we sought 
for nationalist blog-entries written during the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015. Our 
second aim was to demonstrate the rich array of ways that political messages 
may be expressed through blogs. Thus, we chose blog-entries that captured the 
two ‘extremes’ of this continuum, and that in this sense were illustrative of the 
material used in the other sub-studies. The first entry we chose was structured 
as a traditional narrative, whilst the other constituted a prime example of how 
fragmented and multi-layered the discourse in political blogs can be. We 
furthermore wanted to emphasize the impact that discourse contained in 
political blogs may have on the societal and political debate in a country at 
large. Thus, we chose blog-writings of politicians who have become especially 
(in)famous in their respective countries because of their arguments against 
immigration and multiculturalism. The bloggers that, in our view, best 
corresponded to this description were Olli Immonen, MP of the FP, and 
Thoralf Alfsson, former MP of the SD. The two politicians are publicly known 
for their blatant hostility towards immigration and multiculturalism: 
Immonen’s statements led to his exemption from the FP parliamentary group 
in 2015, and Alfsson’s have rendered him being accused of hate-speech. The 
blogs of both politicians reach large readerships12, and their writings have 
frequently been quoted, discussed, praised and criticised in both social and 
mainstream media. In choosing to concentrate on only two single blog-entries 
                                                 
12 According to the statistics on Alfsson’s blog, the blog receives approximately 50,000 unique visitors 
monthly. Immonen’s blog displays no visitor statistics, but 5,800 people like it on Facebook. 
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by these politicians we were able, first, to show the analyses of the entire blog-
entries from beginning to end, including all their verbal and non-verbal 
elements; and second, to thoroughly demonstrate how the analytical steps we 
proposed could be taken. 
 
Table 1 Materials used in sub-studies I, II, III and IV 
Studies Bloggers Time-
period 
Number of 
blogs (N) 
Topics 
I Extreme anti-
immigration (male) 
MP’s from the FP 
and SD 
2008-13  
9  
(4 FP, 5 SD) 
immigration, 
multiculturalism, Islam 
II Female politicians 
from the SD and FP 
2007-14  
6  
(3 FP, 3 SD) 
gender, femininity, 
gender equality, 
feminism, sexual 
minority rights, position 
and rights of women 
III SD politicians with 
ethnic minority 
background  
2010-14  
 
4 SD 
immigration, 
immigration politics, 
immigrant, ethnic 
minority, Sweden 
Democrat(s), Swede, 
Swedish 
IV 1 FP and 1 (former) 
SD MP 
2015 2  
(1 FP, 1 SD) 
The 2015 ‘refugee 
crisis’ 
 
4.2 METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
 
The main analytical approach of this research project relies on work in critical 
discursive psychology (CDP) (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998) presented in 
section 3.4 above. The epistemological assumptions of CDP stem from the 
social constructionist (Burr, 2003; Gergen, 2009) view of reality as 
continuously constructed by human beings in social contexts and through 
social practices, such as discourse. CDP is not a unified research approach, but 
one that draws inspiration from both discursive (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and rhetorical (Billig, 1987; 1988a; 1991) 
psychology. As discussed in section 3.4 above, CDP strives to unpack the 
complex relationship between the individual and the discourse in viewing 
individuals simultaneously as productions and producers of discourse (Edley, 
2001). It conceives of discourse as a production of its historical and societal 
contexts (Edley, 2001), as well as of its particular argumentative context, that 
is, it is interested in what alternatives the discourse is arguing against (Billig, 
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1987). Moreover, the perspective takes into account the social and political 
consequences that the discursive patterns might have (Wetherell, 1998). In 
other words, CDP allows for the critical social psychological examination of 
discourse at both a macro (societal) and micro (interactional) level. 
Accordingly, I found the approach of CDP especially suitable for the purposes 
of the present research-project: to explore how historically and culturally 
embedded resources are reflected in exclusionary nationalist discursive 
constructions, and how such constructions may serve the functions of political 
mobilisation and a deepening of ‘us and them’ divisions. In terms of research 
practices the approach of CDP thus not only enables, but in fact obliges the 
researcher ‘go outside the data’ when conducting analyses. Doing so, my aim 
in this dissertation was to explore the discursive patterns of the blog-entries; 
how they were constructed, as well as what social and political consequences 
the discursive patterns might have. Thus, the analysis focused on the rhetorical 
content, form and functions of the discourse in the political blogs.  
The analytical procedure in each sub-study involved three distinct, yet 
intertwined stages, and the analysis moved back and forth through them as it 
proceeded. In the first stage I (we) read the material multiple times in order to 
identify the patterns, that is, the consistency and variability within and 
between accounts in the material (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The patterns in 
this case were the ways in which the bloggers talked about issues relating to 
immigration and multiculturalism (Study I), notions of gender and femininity 
(Study II), their own identities (Study III) or the nation (Study IV) in their 
accounts. In Study IV analyses of the narrative sequencing (e.g., Bruner, 1991; 
Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Greimas & Courtes, 1979), the literal or denotive 
meanings (Barthes, 1977) of the (audio-)visual elements (e.g., the colours, 
composition and placement of the images; the relationship between the 
displayed actors and the viewers; cf. Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 1996), as well as the prevalence of hyperlinks and communicative 
elements were included in the analysis of content.  
After this initial stage, I (we) set out to explore in detail how these 
discursive patterns were socially constructed and rhetorically organised. More 
specifically, the focus was upon what discursive resources, that is, 
conversational practices, rhetorical commonplaces and liberal principles 
(Potter, 2012; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) the bloggers drew upon when 
constructing and negotiating, for instance, their own identities in relation to 
that of the Other, or notions of gender and national belonging. In addition, our 
interest lay in what rhetorical strategies and devices, such as consensus 
warranting and disclaimers, (e.g. Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Potter, 1996; 
Verkuyten, 2013) the bloggers made use of in their discourse. In Study IV, we 
also analysed the expressive meanings and associations, that is, the 
connotations (Barthes, 1977) that the (audio-)visual material took in the 
context of the blog-entry, and the ways in which the visual elements 
contributed to the rhetorical work of blog’s verbal content (Blair, 2004; Hill, 
2004). Further, we examined how the blogs’ digital and communicative 
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elements, such as hyperlinks (Silva, 2016) and possibilities for blogger-reader 
interactions (Baumer et al., 2011), contributed to the construction of the 
message. 
Finally, in acknowledging that individuals in general – and politicians in 
particular – express themselves in order to achieve certain argumentative and 
persuasive outcomes (Billig, 1987; 1991; Potter and Wetherell, 1987), I (we) 
abided by Michael Billig’s (1988) emphasis on the importance of examining 
political discourse within its argumentative context. In this study, the 
argumentative context of each individual blog-entry is understood in a dual 
sense: on the one hand, it refers to which particular counter-argument I (we) 
interpreted the entry to oppose, and to the ways in which the blogger strived 
to increase the persuasive power of his or her argument; and on the other, it 
refers to the broader societal and/or political debate that the blog-entry 
participated in. Thus, when analysing the blog-entries, I (we) elaborated on 
both their immediate social, as well as their broader societal discursive 
functions. In Study IV we concomitantly elaborated on how the concrete 
(denotation) and associative (connotation) meanings of the (audio-)visual 
material became tied together in ideological or ‘mythical’ layers of meaning 
(e.g., nationalism, freedom, Finnishness) (Barthes, 1977). In line with the 
goals of the critical approach to discourse this study adheres to, the aim of 
these analyses, in sum, was to illuminate what consequences the blog-texts 
might have in a social and political sense. 
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5 FINDINGS: THE POWERFUL DISCOURSE 
CONTAINED IN POPULIST RADICAL 
RIGHT POLITICAL BLOGS 
In this chapter I summarise the main findings of the four sub-studies, 
concentrating on research questions 1 to 5 presented in section 3.4 above, and 
will proceed in the following chapter to discuss the overarching question of 
how blogs can be used as tools for nationalist political communication and 
persuasion. The detailed analyses of the blog-entries and the original results 
are presented in the separate articles (I, II, III, IV). In the present chapter I 
focus on compiling the main discursive patterns of the studied blogs, relating 
and comparing the patterns to each other when relevant. As I will attempt to 
demonstrate, the blog-writings of the male extreme anti-immigration 
politicians, the female politicians and the politicians with immigrant or other 
ethnic minority background shared many common themes and features, yet 
were in important aspects different from one another. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, in section 5.1 I present the 
exclusionary nationalist argumentation that occurred within blog-entries that 
explicitly discussed immigration, multiculturalism and Islam. I move on to the 
discourse that displayed more ambivalence and nuance: in section 5.2.1 I focus 
on how the themes of gender equality, feminism, and cultural differences and 
exclusion based on notions of gender were discussed, and in section 5.2.2 I 
present the discourse in which ethnic identities and borders of national 
belonging were constructed. Finally, in section 5.3 I investigate the 
peculiarities of the discourse contained in populist radical right political blogs. 
As will become clear, the different discursive patterns overlap to a large extent, 
and are separated under the headings below for the sake of clarity. Throughout 
the presentation of the findings I elaborate on the discursive content, form and 
function of the bloggers accounts, as described in section 4.2 above. 
 
5.1 THE DISCOURSE OF OTHERNESS IN FP AND SD 
POLITICAL BLOGS 
In study I and IV we analysed discourse contained in the political blogs of 
extreme anti-immigration MP’s of the FP and SD, with the aim of studying 
how Otherness and notions of national exclusion and inclusion were 
discursively constructed. Through critical discursive and rhetorical 
psychological analyses of the blog accounts we found that Otherness was built 
in three distinct ways in both the Finnish and the Swedish material. The 
similarity of these discursive constructions across both sets of material was 
rather surprising, given the differences in the immigration and asylum policies 
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in the countries at the time (2008-2013). Moreover, the anti-immigration blog 
discourse was to a large extent constructed through rhetorical and discursive 
strategies that are familiar from previous research on radical right discourse 
in other, more traditional fora. Despite these observations we shall see that 
exclusionary nationalism was argued for by the use of somewhat different 
discursive resources in the two countries, and, importantly, that political blogs 
do provide particular features and tools with which nationalist and anti-
immigration aims may be expressed differently than within traditional media 
– a topic I return to in section 5.4 below. 
The first way in which Otherness was constructed in the anti-immigration 
blog-writings was through the depiction of the Other, typically Muslims and 
Africans, in terms of difference, deviance and threat. This representation of 
the Other as a deviant group of people was rhetorically rationalised by the 
bloggers through the use of crime and rape statistics (e.g., Wood & Finlay, 
2008), explicit, precise and specific negative information (e.g., Potter, 1996), 
as well as costs of immigration as discursive resources (e.g., van Dijk, 1992; 
1993a). That is, violations of the norms of the dominant culture and individual 
crimes committed by immigrants or Muslims were described as standing for a 
threat posed by a group as a whole (cf. e.g., Billig, 1987; van Dijk, 1993a; Wood 
& Finlay, 2008).  Here, the Finnish and Swedish discourses differed somewhat 
from each other: the FP bloggers mostly exploited ‘warning’ examples from 
abroad, often from Sweden or another Nordic country, whereas the SD 
bloggers typically referred to their readers’ shared knowledge of individual 
crimes committed by the Other. Moreover, a common theme in both sets of 
material, but even more dominant in the Swedish one, was the juxtaposition 
between immigration and multiculturalism with the maintenance of the 
Nordic welfare system: ‘if we allow the former ones, we must abandon the 
latter’ (cf. e.g., Norocel, 2016; Pyrhönen, 2015). 
The second representation, which we call a threatening ideology, exploited 
liberal arguments (e.g., human rights) and Western culture (e.g., gender 
equality) as discursive resources, and relied heavily on cultural essentialist 
ideas of incompatible cultural differences that constitute a threat to one’s 
nation and group identity (cf. Hopkins et al., 1997; Verkuyten, 2003; 2013).13 
The bloggers went to great lengths to warn their readers about the dangers of 
Islam and its incompatibility with Western, liberal and gender-equal culture, 
and to call for action against it. The supposed threat of Islam was increased by 
exaggerating the outgroup’s presence and great numbers, that is, the 
‘Islamization’ of Finnish and Swedish societies. Again, however, these patterns 
were different in the Finnish as compared with the Swedish discourse: the 
                                                 
13 The social psychological theory of integrated threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) distinguishes between 
realistic (physical, concrete) and symbolic (immaterial, e.g., related to values and norms) forms of threat 
between groups. In the present study, the first representation of immigrants as competing with the 
majority population resembles the former, realistic kind of threat, whereas the second one that focuses 
on the cultural threat of Islam is more akin to the latter, symbolic type of threat. 
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former discourse was characterised by cautionary examples from abroad 
(often from Sweden) and apocalyptic formulations about a gruesome future, 
whereas the latter, by contrast, was dominated by references to a threat that is 
already present: the ongoing ‘Islamization’ in Sweden and the Swedish 
immigration policy with its detrimental effects. 
The third and final representation, that of inner enemies, focused not only 
on excluding immigrants and Muslims from the national ingroup, but also the 
Other amongst us (cf. e.g., Finlay, 2007; Goodman & Johnson, 2014; Mols & 
Jetten, 2014; Wood & Finlay, 2008). Here, the Other, typically (female) 
political opponents, leftist and green politicians, feminists and defenders of 
multiculturalism, were portrayed as unpatriotic traitors to the nation. This, in 
turn, enabled the ingroup, the FP and the SD, to present themselves as 
victimised martyrs and as defenders of the Finnish and Swedish nations and 
their peoples. In the construction of this representation the bloggers presented 
the protection and preservation of national symbols and concepts (cf. Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001b) as incompatible with immigration and multiculturalism. 
The contrast between the FP’s populist-agrarian roots and the SD’s past in 
extreme-right movements was also reflected in this representation of 
Otherness: the FP bloggers frequently referred to their belonging to the hard-
working ‘ordinary Finns’, whereas the SD bloggers distanced themselves from 
and accused the Other of Nazism.  
A further common way in which the blog-accounts were structured was in 
the form of storylines relying on the notion of temporality as a discursive 
resource (cf. Condor, 2006; Jovchelovitch, 2002): everything was better 
before (multiculturalism), and everything will be better if we stop 
‘multiculturalisation’ from going on. In all three representations of Otherness, 
Finnish politicians referred to Sweden, the country more experienced with 
immigration, as a warning example of what will happen if multiculturalism is 
allowed to ‘go too far’, whereas the Swedish politicians presented the threat of 
Islam and the societal unrest that immigration causes as ‘already in the 
making’. Members of both parties, moreover, relied heavily on using nostalgic 
and collective memories in their discourse as a means of arguing against 
multiculturalism (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2014; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b). The 
way nostalgia was used, however, depended highly on the context: the FP 
politicians drew upon the 19th century formation of the Finnish nation, and 
above all, upon the spirit of the Winter War that unites the (‘true’) Finns 
against the forces of multiculturalism. Thus, they created a binary opposition 
between the benefits of such manifestations of national unity and 
homogeneity, on the one hand, and the costs of multiculturalism, on the other. 
The Finnish bloggers, moreover, constructed the dangerousness of the inner 
Other through drawing parallels between present-day multicultural policies 
and the Soviet or Communist threat of the past.  This discursive pattern 
reflects Finland’s history with, proximity to and continued complex 
relationship with its big neighbour Russia. Radical right politicians in post-
communist countries have indeed been shown to exploit similar rhetoric, for 
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example in Hungary (Woodley, 2013) where political opponents such as 
Socialists are labelled as communists, and in Romania (Mᾰdroane, 2013), 
where EU-positive political measures are compared with the Soviet 
occupation.  
The SD bloggers, in turn, nostalgically yearned back to and wished to 
restore the folkhem, when Swedish welfare was still meant for Swedes and 
Swedes alone (Studies I and IV). Typically, Social Democrats, who are known 
as the creators of the folkhem, were accused of abandoning it, whereas the SD 
were depicted as its sole remaining protectors, and as the only ones who still 
realise that it requires national homogeneity. Also not absent from the Finnish 
material, the discursive pattern of juxtaposing welfare with multiculturalism 
or immigration reflects the Nordic, and especially Swedish, context and its 
reputation as ‘cradle of social welfare’, and is to be understood precisely in the 
light of the fact that the Nordic welfare model was introduced before larger 
scale immigration to the region began. Thus, despite the ‘leftist’ connotation 
of the notion of the welfare system (Coontz, 1992), contrasting this 
‘harmonious’ period of relative ethnic homogeneity with the ‘rupture’ that 
immigration has entailed, seems to be a fruitful way for the Finnish and 
especially the Swedish populist radical right bloggers to argue against a 
multicultural society (cf. Norocel, 2016; Pyrhönen, 2015).  
In summary, through conveying their arguments in the form of socially 
recognised storylines with the potential to emotionally engage the readers 
(László, 2002); and through drawing parallels to carefully selected moments 
in the nations’ histories (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b), both the Finnish and 
Swedish politicians strove to appeal to their readers and invite them to join in 
their present fight against multiculturalism. Indeed, Törrönen (2000) has 
demonstrated that political arguments delivered i narrative form have an 
especially persuasive appeal, as they superimpose their version of the world 
on that of the audience, thus motivating the audience to act towards a future 
goal advocated by the politician. Similarly, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001b, p. 
150) put it: ‘The past is powerful in defining contemporary identity because it 
is represented in terms of a narrative structure which invites those in the 
present to see themselves as participants in an ongoing drama’.  
In order to elaborate on the voter-mobilizing potential of these three 
representations of Otherness, it seems that that of inner enemies was the most 
crucial one in this regard, as it served two important discursive functions. 
First, it created a victimised ingroup position: ‘we (the FP or SD and others 
that oppose immigration) are the true victims of racism’. Second, it refined the 
category of the ingroup, from people who oppose immigration to covering ‘the 
people’, and extended the outgroup to include immigrants and proponents of 
multiculturalism. Not only did these functions reverse the racist label and thus 
serves to scapegoat the Other as being racist and unpatriotic, but also, in 
particular in case of the SD, they allowed the ingroup to distance itself from its 
own extreme past and reputation (cf. Goodman & Johnson, 2014). In sum, 
they created an image of the ingroup as the good, average Finnish/Swedish 
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people, who are the only true defenders of the nation, and who invites the 
readers to join them (cf., Rapley, 1998; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012). In line 
with what Reicher and colleagues (2008) suggest in their Five-Step Social 
Identity Model of the development of collective hate, this construction of the 
ingroup as good and virtuous in combination with the outgroup as evil and 
threatening creates an impression that hostility towards the latter is not only 
warranted, but in fact morally sound. Figure 1 below provides an example of a 
Finnish blog-entry that depicts precisely such a contrast between a 
‘harmonious’ past of national homogeneity and the ills of present-day 
multiculturalism (Study IV). 
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Figure 1 Finnish anti-multiculturalism blog-entry. 
Blue and 
white colour-
world 
invoking 
nationalism 
Presentation 
of the 
blogger e.g., 
as a father 
and member 
of nationalist 
organisations 
Powerful title: 
‘Multiculturalism 
destroys 
national unity’ 
Main text in the 
form of a story 
with beginning, 
middle and end 
Blogger’s 
gaze 
directed at 
the viewer 
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5.2 ‘WE ARE NO POLITICAL ALIBIS’ – WOMEN AND 
IMMIGRANTS WITHIN THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT 
With regards to the discourse of female populist radical right politicians (Study 
II) and populist radical right politicians with immigrant or other ethnic 
minority background (Study III), my research shows that this discourse carries 
notable similarities to, yet is in many ways different from that of their white, 
male colleagues that I studied. Echoing what was described above, these 
politicians also depicted immigrant (typically Muslim) men as rapists and 
criminals, and Islam as a threatening ideology, drawing upon notions of 
gender equality and women’s rights in order to contrast the gender culture of 
Islam to that of Sweden and Finland. This discursive pattern resembles Said’s 
(1978) notion of an orientalist discourse, where white (Swedish  and  Finnish) 
women are constructed as the victims of the sexualized violence committed by 
the invading  ‘Other’  man  (cf. Blee, 2007;  Koonz, 1987).  A further similarity 
pertains to the prototype of the inner enemy, the (female) anti-racist, 
multiculturalist, feminist or left-winger (e.g., Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; 
Wood & Finlay, 2008), personified in what is pejoratively called ‘ladies in 
flowery hats’ (kukkahattutädit)14 in Finland, and in the (female) Social 
Democrats and the ‘wrong kind of feminists’ in Sweden, as I will further 
discuss below. These discourses capture the paradoxical way in which the 
nationalist discourse of the SD and FP is gendered: white women are depicted 
as both innocent victims and despised advocators of a multicultural society. 
However, the discourse of both the female politicians and those with 
immigrant or other ethnic minority background certainly carried features that 
set it apart from such ‘typical’ radical right discourse. The latter politicians not 
only accused their inner enemies of failed immigration policies, but could also 
draw upon their ethnic minority belonging in order to accuse political 
opponents (and other immigrants) of discriminating against them because of 
the political choices they have made – precisely because of this belonging 
(section 5.2.2 below). With regards to the female politicians (section 5.2.1 
below), a central element of their discourse was their depiction of themselves 
as the only ones genuinely interested in protecting the Other immigrant 
(Muslim) woman, who in turn was portrayed as a victim of the suppressive 
gender culture of Islam. This feature has been called care racism by Mulinari 
and Neergaard (2014, p. 52) ‘where “they” are regarded as a monolithic group 
without individuality, and where “we” have responsibility for “our” migrants’. 
Most importantly, nevertheless, what characterised the discourse of both these 
groups of politicians was how ambivalences – between norms of gender 
                                                 
14 The FP have coined this term for stereotypically referring to white, well educated women who hold a 
position of power in society or politics and actively support multiculturalism (Keskinen, 2011; 2013; 
Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012; Norocel, 2013). The term bears a derogatory and ridiculing connotation: 
these women are accused of naively and blindly supporting (male) immigrants at the cost of the good of 
their ‘own’ people. 
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equality and a patriarchal politics in the case of the female politicians (Study 
II), and between an ethnic minority or immigrant versus an anti-immigration 
political identity in the case of the politicians with immigrant or other ethnic 
minority background (Study III) – were discursively negotiated. As we shall 
see, these negotiations could serve distinct social and political functions. 
5.2.1 DILEMMAS OF FEMINISM AND PATRIARCHY 
 
As Cristian Norocel (2013, p. 156) notes, being simultaneously a woman and a 
politician seems to go counter to the populist radical right ideology, since 
women in so doing abandon their designated role within the patriarchal, 
heteronormative family structure that such parties advocate. Beverly Skeggs 
(1997), in turn, maintains that the categorised positions we hold (in terms of 
class, race, gender etc.) determine how we construct our subjectivities and our 
view of the social world. Inspired by these assumptions, I set out to investigate 
the little explored question of how women negotiate the contradictory position 
of being a woman in a Nordic country, where gender equality is regarded as 
‘common-place’ (Billig, 1987; Holli, 2003; Keskinen, 2013), yet 
simultaneously being active in a party that stands for white male heterosexual 
privilege and cherishes traditional gender roles (De los Reyes et al., 2003; 
Fekete, 2006). From this extraordinary position, how do they construct and 
use the notions of gender and femininity15? How do they understand and 
negotiate the populist radical right ideology of gendered nationalism (cf. 
chapter 3.2.1)? 
My analysis of female populist radical right politicians’ blog discourse 
discussing gender and femininity showed that this discourse was indeed highly 
ambivalent. The discourse was characterized by an ideological dilemma (Billig 
et al., 1988) that I called feminism versus patriarchy. This dilemma stems 
from the tension between the normative value of gender equality on the one 
hand, and the obligation to abide by the patriarchal party ideology, on the 
other. It was most prevalent in the discourses, or interpretative repertoires16 
                                                 
15 Following Skeggs (1997, pg. 98) I approach the concept of femininity as a process that shapes the 
way in which ‘women are gendered and become specific sorts of women’. I see the notion of gender as a 
social construction (e.g., Burr 2003; Gergen 2009), produced and reproduced by human beings in 
specific social and historical contexts, and determining what it means to be male or female or intersex. 
16 While ‘discourse’ is a common term, often used simply when referring to talk or text, the 
relationship between the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘interpretative repertoire’ is somewhat ambiguous, and 
they are indeed often used as synonyms. In their classic book Discourse and social psychology (1987, p. 
138) Potter and Wetherell define interpretative repertoires as ‘a lexicon or register of terms and 
metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events’. In Edley’s (2001, p. 198) words, 
interpretative repertoires are ‘relatively coherent ways of talking about objects and events in the world’; 
‘”building blocks of conversation”, a range of linguistic resources that can be drawn upon and utilized in 
the course of everyday social interaction.’ Edley contends that the concept of discourse is very much akin 
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(cf. Edley, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) that, first, argued against 
affirmative action for women and minorities and for maintaining traditional, 
heteronormative gender roles; and second, that aimed at scapegoating 
feminists and female political opponents. The prevalence of this dilemma and 
how it was negotiated revealed not only differences between the ‘female’ and 
‘male’ discourses that I studied, but also between those of the Finnish and 
Swedish female politicians. 
The FP and SD women devoted a vast amount of blog-space to explaining 
the low percentage of women in the parties, and to justifying their own political 
choices. The underrepresentation of women in the FP was described as a 
consequence of the media’s lack of interest in the women in the party, whereas 
the reason given by the SD-women was that the scapegoating of the SD and 
the attacks directed at their members scare women away. This difference 
reflects well the different treatment the parties receive by political opponents 
and the media alike in their respective countries. All bloggers, however, 
presented their parties as the only truly gender equal ones, where everyone 
gets treated as an individual and not according to gender. The women also 
emphasized that joining the party was a result of their own independent will, 
and dodged any accusations of being exploited by the party in order for it to 
appear women-friendly. These claims were one way in which the female 
politicians discursively tackled the feminism versus patriarchy dilemma.  
A feature that distinguished the Finnish and Swedish discourses from each 
other was the Finnish bloggers’ depiction of differences between genders as 
natural or given by god – a theme that was much less prevalent in among the 
Swedish ones. These depictions represented the patriarchal party ideology 
that sees heteronormative gender roles as a fundamental pillar of society, but 
were nevertheless discursively framed according to the standards of a modern, 
gender equal society: the differences allegedly maintain harmony and are even 
desirable. 
As discussed in section 2.2 above, the argument that gender equality is 
‘accomplished’ and requires no further efforts can be forcefully used to counter 
feminist voices about prevailing inequalities (e.g., Lockwood Harris et al., 
2012; Norocel, 2016). Such discourse was employed by both the FP and SD 
women in order to argue against structural measures for enhancing women’s 
position in the labour market. As a result, the ideological dilemma of feminism 
versus patriarchy was efficiently negotiated without the need for statements 
that appeared patriarchal to women on the one hand, or went counter to the 
party ideology, on the other. My study thus confirms previous findings that 
                                                 
to these meanings, and similarly tied to the concept of ideology. Distinguishing between the concepts 
may be a matter of how they are understood in different disciplines: in so-called Focauldian discourse 
analysis that focuses on relations of power and dominance, the concept of discourse acquires a meaning 
related to how macro-level institutionalised discourses impact upon the human subject (Edley, 2001, p. 
201). Interpretative repertoires, in turn, carry a less consolidated meaning, and are more connected with 
the micro-level at which human beings, as active agents, may flexibly use them in their everyday talk.  
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populist radical right politicians use the notion of gender equality as a border 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, where ‘they’ may flexibly refer either to political 
opponents who propose measures for enhancing gender equality, as discussed 
here, or when essentialising and othering the ‘misogynist’ Islamic culture, as 
discussed in section 5.1 above (cf. De los Reyes, Molina & Mulinari, 2003; 
Holli, 2003; Horsti, 2016; Keskinen, 2013; Keskinen et al., 2009; Mulinari & 
Neergaard, 2014; Norocel, 2013; 2016; Tuori, 2007). As my results illustrate, 
these arguments were put forward by populist radical right politicians 
regardless of gender. 
When discussing feminism the female bloggers did not elaborate on 
different feminist movements and ideologies; rather, they expressed suspicion 
and even hostility towards ‘feminism’ in general. However, even though a vast 
amount of the Swedish discourse was devoted to charges against feminists and 
gender scholars, these discursive attacks were much more dilemmatic than the 
blatant opposition to and distancing from feminism in the Finnish material. 
In this discursive context a way for the Swedish bloggers to navigate between 
the Scylla and Charybdis of feminism versus patriarchy was, intriguingly, to 
position themselves and present their arguments, not as Sweden Democrats, 
but as the ‘right kind of feminists’. These feminists resist ‘derogatory’ 
affirmative action for women in the labour market, and wish to ‘liberate’ 
Muslim women from their subordination by men; unlike the ‘wrong kind of 
feminists’ that waste time on irrelevant or harmful matters such as promoting 
gender-neutral politics and measures to enhance the position of women in the 
labour market. The Finnish bloggers, by contrast, did not go through similar 
extensive rhetorical work, but simply dismissed feminists as male-haters. 
Overall, discourse aimed at scapegoating feminists, maintaining traditional, 
heteronormative gender roles and arguing against gay marriage and adoption 
rights was far less ambiguous in the FP as compared with the SD material. 
The discourse of the FP women indicates that the Finnish long-lasting 
societal suspicion of feminism, illustrated in the common saying ‘I do support 
gender equality, but I am not a feminist’ (Holli, 2003, p. 16) persists. The 
discourse of the SD, on the other hand, reflects the power of the feminist norm 
in Swedish society: it is simply much less politically accepted to say that you 
oppose it. Consequentially, and borrowing terminology from studies of 
intergroup relations, the Swedish female politicians were forced to ‘subtype’ 
(e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2003) the category of feminists into ‘favourable’ and 
‘non-favourable’ ones, and could then place themselves within the former sub-
category. Their Finnish colleagues could instead more lightly resist the 
feminist category completely (cf. Ellemers, et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the 
discursive functions of the Swedish and Finnish bloggers’ discourses were 
similar: in both cases, the patriarchal and even misogynist label normally 
attached to the blogger’s ingroup (the SD or FP) was removed and transferred 
to their antagonists, that is, to (the wrong kind of) feminists, political 
opponents and the Islamic community. In other words, the function was to 
produce a reversal of misogyny (cf. the concept of ‘reversal of racism’, e.g., 
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van Dijk, 1993a). My analyses, in sum, suggest that the dilemma of feminism 
versus patriarchy was remarkably more problematic for the SD than for the 
FP women, and that this difference provides an intriguing illustration of how 
inseparable (political) discourse is from its surrounding societal and political 
context (cf. Billig, 1987; Edley, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). 
5.2.2 (IN)COMPATIBLE ETHNIC IDENTITIES 
 
Being an immigrant or ethnic minority member in an anti-immigration party 
seems like a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, the SD politicians with 
immigrant or other ethnic minority background whose blogs we studied 
oftentimes did not touch upon this background at all, but included themselves 
in an unproblematic way in the category of ‘Swedes’. Yet, a closer examination 
of their accounts revealed that their ethnic identity constructions were by no 
means always straightforward. Rather, the discourse was also characterised by 
a complex shifting between ethnic majority and minority identifications, at an 
assigned, external level as well as on an asserted, more personal level 
(Berbrier, 2008; Merino & Tileagă, 2011). Such navigations between different 
identities could take place even within the same blog-entry. 
A significant amount of the blog-accounts of the populist radical right 
politicians with immigrant or other ethnic minority background was devoted 
to the discursive tension between an assigned immigrant or ethnic minority 
identity on the one hand, and an asserted Swedish identity, on the other. One 
way of solving this tension was for the bloggers to make a distinction between 
an ethnic minority identity and a personally claimed national and cultural 
majority one. More commonly, the bloggers accepted an ethnic minority 
identity at a level of being and knowing: they established the inevitable 
matter-of-factness of being an ethnic minority member through drawing upon 
origin, biological traits and physical appearance as discursive resources (cf. 
Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002). Yet, at the more personal level of feeling, doing, 
and wanting, they resisted this identity. For example, the bloggers could 
actively claim a majority Swedish identity and resist a minority one through 
drawing upon their early socialisation, their love and pride for Sweden and 
their free will as discursive resources.  
A rarer discursive pattern among the bloggers involved the construction of 
an asserted, deeper sense not only of a majority identity, but of a 
simultaneously and equally actively claimed minority one. Referring to 
wanting, that is, to their independent free will, when constructing different 
identities and positions for themselves and motivating their political choices, 
was a salient pattern not only in the discourse of the bloggers with immigrant 
or other ethnic minority background, but, as discussed in the previous section, 
also in that of the female bloggers. Here we must acknowledge that these 
identities and positions were being claimed in the context of political 
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discourse, where demonstrating one’s capacity to make deliberate personal 
choices can be even more important than in everyday talk. 
Viewed from a critical discursive psychological perspective the ethnic 
identity-constructions described above served distinct discursive functions. 
One such function was that the speakers could distinguish themselves, the 
‘good immigrants’ from the ‘bad ones’, who were accused of mechanically 
accepting a pre-made pattern for how to be an immigrant, and, even more 
importantly, of falsely claiming to be faced with structural racism in society. 
In the discourse of the female bloggers with immigrant or other ethnic 
minority background, furthermore, their ethnic and gendered identity 
constructions often intermingled (Studies II and III). These bloggers typically 
resisted the need for structural measures to enhance the position of 
immigrants and women in Swedish society with the argument that both 
gender equality and ‘immigrant-friendliness’ are already accomplished. The 
possibilities for women and minority members to ’make it’ in society, it was 
implied, depend not upon structural factors, but on individual ones (cf. Holli, 
2003; Magnusson, 2000). This discourse is an analogy of that of the female 
politicians (Study II) that positioned themselves in contrast to gender 
scholars, feminists and female political opponents, who were accused of not 
caring for immigrants and women, of being pretentious or having gotten it (= 
women’s best interests) all wrong. Thus, favouring cultural assimilation and 
resisting structural measures to enhance the position of ethnic minorities and 
women are not stances confined to majority group members or men, but may 
indeed also be forwarded by ethnic minority group members and women 
themselves (cf. Verkuyten, 2005). This may, the present study suggests, be the 
case in a discursive context where the goal is to transmit a populist radical 
right or nationalist political message (illustrated in the example in Figure 2 
below, from Study III; see also: Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b).  
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Figure 2 Pro-cultural assimilation and nationalist political blog-entry by female SD-
politician of Ukrainian origin. 
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According to our analyses, assuming an immigrant or ethnic minority 
identity – even if it remained at a superficial level – allowed the populist 
radical right bloggers with immigrant or other ethnic minority background to 
construct subject positions of the racists, that is, political opponents, and the 
non-racists and the true victims of racism – the SD. To be precise, whilst 
denying the existence of structural racism in Swedish society, the bloggers 
drew upon their minority membership as well as their independent free will in 
order to accuse political opponents (and other immigrants) of discriminating 
against them because of the political choices they had made because they are 
immigrants. Such accusations not only reversed the racist label of the SD and 
attached it to their political opponents, but also remained faithful to the SD’s 
anti-immigration political agenda. The bloggers and their discourse, 
concomitantly, served as ‘proof’ of the party having rid itself of its racist past. 
Again, a similar function was served by the discourse of the female politicians, 
who, in their proclamations of their parties as the only gender-equal ones that 
welcomed them into their ranks with open arms, asserted that these parties 
cannot be hostile to women and gender equality.  
5.3 THE MULTIFACETED CHARACTER OF DISCOURSE 
CONTAINED IN POLITICAL BLOGS: MOVING BEYOND 
THE TEXT 
As I hope to have demonstrated above, the present research into populist 
radical right political blogs shows that this discourse is very much akin to 
political discourse in other, more conventional settings like political speeches, 
and interviews and statements in traditional media.  Self-defensive discursive 
strategies, such as the denial and reversal of racism (e.g., van Dijk, 1993a), the 
construction of common – internal and external – enemies (e.g., Wood & 
Finlay, 2008), culturally essentialist views about Islam (e.g., Verkuyten, 2013), 
extensive use of collective and nostalgic memories as discursive resources 
(e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2014; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b), self-positioning as a 
representative of the ‘ordinary people’ (e.g., Rapley, 1998), and use of notions 
of gender to demarcate boundaries between ‘us and them’ (e.g., Keskinen, 
2013; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014; Norocel, 2013; 2016) are well-documented 
features of populist and radical right political discourse. This notwithstanding, 
the present study is able to show that political blogs do provide politicians with 
unique tools for expressing political messages. In this section I shall argue, 
first, that the tools provided by the blogs are especially useful for politicians 
who wish to convey socially sensitive views, such as negative stances on 
immigration, immigrants and multiculturalism; and second, that any 
researcher who wishes to investigate political blogs needs to deploy an 
analytical approach that is able to grasp the multidimensional character of the 
discourse they contain. 
 
Findings: The powerful discourse contained in populist radical right political blogs 
68 
Roughly, the blog-entries we studied can be positioned between the two 
extremes, of, on the one hand, those which were structured as traditional 
narratives with a clear beginning, middle and end, where the speaker him- or 
herself was dominant and the argumentation solid and concise; and on the 
other, those entries that lacked a coherent structure, and were instead built up 
as a conglomerate of verbal, intertextual, digital, (audio-)visual and 
communicative features. The blog-entries of the former kind relied on the use 
of classical discursive resources and rhetorical tools, whereas the latter kind 
also incorporated various non-verbal elements that the blogosphere offers. 
This division is by no means clear-cut; indeed the blog-entries were typically a 
mixture of both types. It is important to note that the different ways in which 
the blog-entries were structured may be the consequence of many factors, such 
as the particular formats of the blogs – some being more technologically 
advanced than others and thus allowing for more digital manoeuvring (cf. 
Giles et al., 2015) – as well as of the rhetorical preferences and skills of the 
individual blogger. Thus, it is not necessarily always the nature of the message 
that the politician wants to convey that determines the structure and form of 
the blog-entry, even though this may oftentimes be the case. 
A central aspect that sets the blogs apart from other channels for conveying 
political messages is their structure, visual design and colour-world. The blogs 
we studied were often visually loaded with nationalist codes, such as blue-
white colours in the Finnish ones (see Figure 1), and blue-yellow in the 
Swedish (Figure 2), symbolising the national flags of the two countries, 
respectively. In other cases, they appealed to nationalist sentiments in 
displaying pictures of places or buildings of national symbolic importance 
(Figure 3 below), serving to bring the readers together into a sense of imagined 
national community (Helmers & Hill, 2004, p. 4). It was common that the 
blogs featured an image of the blogger him- or herself, typically with his or her 
eyes directed towards the viewers, thus creating an imaginary relation of 
equality with them, and reinforcing a feeling of togetherness and mutual 
understanding (Figure 1; cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). 
 Like the verbal elements, also the visual components of the blogs could be 
‘read’ at multiple levels, that is, at the concrete level of connotation, at the 
associative level of denotation and the ideological level of myth (Barthes, 
1977). To take an example (Figure 3 below, from Study IV), in the context of a 
blog-entry that argued that multiculturalism is a threat to the nation, an image 
of a burning white candle in the midst of blackness (level of connotation) could 
be interpreted as symbolising the fading nation that will continue to burn if no 
action is taken to prevent this (level of denotation). At the final mythical level, 
the candle may represent the whiteness of the nation, and the surrounding 
darkness the threat of the intruding immigrant Other. There is nothing about 
a candle per se that symbolises immigration, or urgency and threat – indeed, 
these layers of meaning would have very different content in other 
argumentative contexts. Within political blogs, however, such visual elements 
can serve as important anchorages for the verbal messages, increasing their 
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persuasive power and steering the reader towards a meaning that the blogger 
has chosen in advance (Barthes, 1977, p. 40). With regards to conveying 
nationalist political messages, images and (audio-)visual material can, 
through their expressiveness, immediacy and symbolism, convey what it may 
be societally unacceptable for words to do (cf. Jewitt & Oyama, 2001). 
Another strikingly common feature of the blogs we studied was the use of 
intertextuality and what I call digital voicing – the digital provision of external 
information-sources or voices of others that enhanced the factuality and 
credibility of the blogger’s message (cf. Potter, 1996). Typically, this digital 
voicing was done through hyperlinking to external sources, such as carefully 
selected pieces of news, anti-immigration websites or other blogs. Oftentimes 
a blog-entry included not only the writings of the blogger him- or herself, but 
could be comprised of extensive quotes from others. These others were usually 
either persons who could appear as external and objective experts on a matter, 
or likeminded politicians who held a position of higher authority and could 
thus also be regarded as ‘experts’ in the eyes of an equally likeminded audience 
(cf. Potter’s, 1996, notion of ‘category entitlement’). Equally common was the 
use of strong or emotion-provoking audio-visual and visual material, such as 
documentary films about radical, violent Islamist groups, nostalgic music-
videos about the ‘past glory’ of the nation, and pictures that displayed Muslim 
men in a depersonalised and threatening way. What all of these strategies 
accomplish is that the blogger can convey radical, immigration-hostile 
messages without actually saying anything him- or herself. Put differently, the 
use of such digital and audio-visual elements function as a self-protective 
discursive strategy of sorts: if the blogger does not take an explicit stance, he 
or she cannot lightly be accused of holding racist or prejudiced views. And 
were that to happen, the blogger is able to counter with the assertion that he 
or she merely provided ‘evidence that speaks for itself’. 
A further element that captures the particularity of political blogging is 
their collaborative and communicative character. Specifically, the bloggers in 
this study often phrased themselves through rhetorical questions for the 
readers to consider, enabling an implicit dialogue in which the content and 
meaning of the blog-entry became co-constructed together with the readers 
(Baumer et al., 2011). Commonly, a piece of emotion-evoking (audio-)visual 
material, or a quote in favour of multiculturalism by a political antagonist, 
would be preceded or followed by such a question. This functioned to leave the 
reader with the responsibility of drawing the conclusions of what was being 
implied, for instance, that the presented visual material captured or ‘proved’ 
the threat that multiculturalism entails for the nation, or that the pro-
multiculturalism stance is detrimental. Communicating political messages in 
this way may not only enhances the credibility of the message in the eyes of 
the readers, but can also create a sense of connectedness between the blogging 
politician and the readers, who stand united against the conspiracy of 
immigrants and their protectors. Such populist ‘we against them’ 
identifications extend beyond the typical one-way communication within 
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more traditional forms of media (cf. Karlsson & Åström, 2014; Nilsson & 
Carlsson, 2014)17.  
 
                                                 
17 Unfortunately, it was beyond the scope of this dissertation to study also the reader-comments in the 
blogs, but this is certainly a topic of importance for future research to explore (cf. chapter 6.4 below). 
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Figure 3 Example of the use of audio-visual and digital elements in Swedish nationalist 
political blogging. 
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In order to study this multifaceted blog-discourse (Study IV), we adopted 
an analytical approach that followed the principles of critical discursive and 
rhetorical psychology, and also integrated analytical tools and concepts from 
the research fields of narrative psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1991; Gergen & 
Gergen, 1988; Greimas & Courtes, 1979), visual analysis and social semiotics 
(e.g., Barthes, 1977; Jewitt & Oyama; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996; van 
Leeuwen, 2005) as well as from research on online political communication 
(e.g., Baumer et al., 2011; Nilsson & Carlsson, 2014; Silva, 2016). This 
combination of analytical perspectives was not only possible, but rather, I 
maintain, becomes necessary if one wants to grasp the multitude of elements 
contained in political blogs and analyse how these elements interact in the 
construction of a political message (but see sections 3.4 and 6.2 for reflections 
on the difficulties in combining these different approaches).  
The critical discursive and rhetorical psychological analyses allowed us, 
first, to study the socially constructed and situated character and the rhetorical 
organisation of the blog-discourse. Second, acknowledging that the blog-
entries were oftentimes conveyed in the form of emotion-appealing stories or 
narratives, similarly socially embedded (Bruner, 1991; Gergen & Gergen, 
1988), the tools from the area of narrative psychology enabled us to scrutinise 
how the bloggers gave themselves the favoured position as the ‘hero’ of the 
story, as opposed to the countering (political) position of the ‘villain’ (Propp, 
1968). Third, the analytical procedures of visual analyses and social semiotics 
made it possible to investigate the role that the (audio-)visual elements, such 
as pictures and videos, played in the transmission of the political message, or 
what ‘hidden meanings’ they could embody (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001). Finally, 
insights from research into the collaborative construction of arguments 
(Baumer et al., 2011) and the use of hyperlinks in political blogs (Silva, 2016) 
permitted us to study the role that these elements played in the context of 
populist radical right and nationalist political blogging.  
With the afore-described multi-methodological approach it was possible in 
detail to demonstrate how political blogs can efficiently be used for purposes 
of political communication and persuasion of exclusionary nationalist aims. It 
allowed for studying how various ‘classical’ rhetorical devices (Potter, 1996) 
and resources (Potter, 2012; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) interacted in intricate 
ways with narrative, digital, communicative and (audio-)visual elements in 
political blogs. The present research shows that these elements reinforced each 
other within the peculiar sphere of the blog that through its visual design and 
possibilities for blogger-reader interaction made the political messages unique 
in their form. It seems that – thanks to these features – rhetoric contained in 
the blogs of influential politicians need not be phrased in extreme and socially 
risky wordings in order to serve its purpose: to invite the readers to unite for 
an exclusionary nationalist political cause. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This study has explored exclusionary and gendered forms of nationalist 
discourse in Finnish and Swedish populist radical right political blogs. Radical 
right and nationalist political discourse is a timely topic, in society and 
academia alike. This dissertation has explored the ways in which social 
psychological phenomena of self-presentation, identity-constructions, 
discursive divisions between ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’, persuasion, and 
appeals to emotions and nostalgic memories are implicated in the nationalist 
categories (cf. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b) constructed within populist radical 
right political blogs. In so doing, the aim of this study has been twofold: on the 
one hand, it has been to show how social psychological research can contribute 
to our understanding of contemporary nationalist discourse, and on the other, 
it has been to contribute to social psychological research on nationalist 
political discourse with empirical, theoretical and methodological insights. In 
the present chapter I summarise and evaluate the results of the present study, 
and reflect upon its limitations in terms of its empirical context as well as 
methodology. Subsequently I discuss the ethical concerns involved in this 
study, after which I suggest directions for future research. I then elaborate 
upon the practical implications of the study and finish with some concluding 
remarks. 
6.1 EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS 
Let us first turn to the central aim of this dissertation outlined in section 3.4 
above: to explore how blogs may be used as tools for nationalist political 
communication and persuasion. As I hope to have demonstrated in the 
previous section, the way that blogs can efficiently serve this particular 
purpose is in their provision of digital and (audio-)visual elements that 
together with ‘classical’ rhetorical devices – or on their own – serve to increase 
the persuasive power and credibility of the blogger’s message. They do so by 
allowing for the expression of derogatory and even racist arguments, whilst 
nevertheless protecting the blogger from accusations of spreading such 
arguments – the reason being that he or she has not needed to express a 
personal view on the matter at hand. The communicative character of the blog-
discourse is equally pivotal: it enables the blogger to construct his or her 
message in an implicit, and oftentimes explicit, dialogue with the readers, 
which serves to increase a sense of mutual understanding between the blogger 
and the readership. In summary, these features entail that the blog-discourse 
becomes more than the sum of its parts: it creates an atmosphere of ‘us, the 
people and true defenders of this nation’ against ‘them, the intruding or 
Discussion 
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deceptive national enemies’. This renders the blog a particularly fruitful tool 
for nationalist political communication and persuasion. 
Turning then to the other, more specific research questions, the first of 
these was also an overarching one that sought an understanding of the 
potential social and political consequences of the discourse studied in this 
dissertation. The study set out to explore these implications or functions (cf. 
Edley, 2001) of the blog-discourse at two distinct, yet intertwined levels: at the 
immediate, argumentative one, as well as at the broader societal one. At the 
first level, the blog-discourse functioned to deny racist and misogynist views 
only to reverse them and attach them instead to the argumentative opponent, 
that is, to the bloggers’ political antagonists, the ‘so-called’ anti-racists and 
feminists. Further, and in relation to the point above about political blogging, 
it created antagonistic relations between ‘us’, the victimised yet proud 
defenders of the nation, who speak on behalf of the people, and ‘them’, the 
national traitors who support immigrants and multiculturalism (Studies I and 
IV). At this level the blog discourse also functioned to create divisions between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants and feminists, which, moving away from the 
immediate argumentative context to the second, broader one, served to deny 
the existence of structural racism and discrimination of women in Finnish or 
Swedish societies; to argue against affirmative action for advancing the 
position of these groups; and to cleanse the bloggers’ party’s image of being 
racist or misogynist. The division between ‘good’ immigrants – those who have 
abandoned their culture, and the ‘bad’ ones – those who hold on to it, also 
served efficiently to promote a policy of assimilation and resist a multicultural 
society (Studies II and III). The bloggers’ constructions of a binary opposition 
between ‘bad’ multiculturalism and ‘good’ ethnic and cultural homogeneity 
served, finally, to motivate why welfare provisions and the right to remain in 
the country should be the exclusive right of the narrowly defined, ‘original and 
true’ Finns or Swedes (and of culturally sufficiently similar or assimilated 
exceptions). In sum, the importance of the ways in which the politicians 
categorised themselves in order to express hostile views towards others 
reaffirms Reicher, Haslam and Rath’s (2008) argument that in the production 
of outgroup hostility our definition of our ingroup is as central – perhaps even 
more central – than that of the outgroup. 
Proceeding now to evaluate the findings of the present study in more detail, 
it is clear that its empirical setting – that of Finland and Sweden – limits the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the analyses of the blog discourse. The 
constructionist perspective I have adhered to conceives of discourse as 
inseparable from the social context within which it is embedded. Thus, even 
though the results indicate that many aspects of it indeed do have 
transnational character, the discourse explored here is first and foremost a 
reflection of the particular Finnish and Swedish contexts. In connection to 
this, one may rightfully ask why the context of Finland and Sweden was indeed 
chosen in the first place. What make results obtained in this setting 
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theoretically interesting for social scientific research on nationalist political 
discourse?  
My answer to this question, which I have sought to discuss at length also in 
chapter 2 above, is twofold. First, as we have seen, Finland and Sweden deviate 
from previously studied country-contexts in terms of their strong norms of 
gender equality (e.g., Holli, 2003; Magnusson et al., 2008), their remarkable 
reliance on the social democratic welfare project that was initiated during a 
period of relative ethnic homogeneity (Finseraas, 2012), their short history of 
large-scale immigration, and, finally, their populations that are especially 
active users of social media (Karlsson & Åström, 2014; Strandberg, 2013) – a 
matter crucial for the electoral fortunes that the populist radical right only very 
recently, during the 21st century, managed to gain. Indeed, the fact that even 
Sweden – the ultimate cradle of social democracy, welfare and gender equality 
– now has witnessed the rise of a party that represents the radical right and is 
even widely regarded as racist seems to indicate that this can happen 
anywhere.  
My study does show that Finnish and Swedish populist radical right 
politicians flexibly, and more or less ambivalently, use notions of gender 
equality as an argument in their exclusionary and gendered nationalist 
discourse (Studies I, II and III). This rhetorical strategy reveals something 
about the uniqueness of the Nordic context and its historical emphasis on and 
societal norms of gender equality: it is not politically credible to express 
anything but support for the notion. Yet, this very normativity and ‘common-
senseness’ allows for different political actors to exploit it for their particular 
political purposes (cf. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b). As we have seen, the FP and 
SD have managed, on the one hand, to position themselves as supporters and 
protectors of gender equality, and, on the other, to use it as a discursive 
resource for constructing antagonistic identities and draw boundaries between 
in- and outgroups (e.g., De los Reyes, Molina & Mulinari, 2003; Holli, 2003; 
Horsti, 2016; Keskinen, 2013; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014; Tuori, 2007). The 
same holds true for the in the Nordic context equally ‘sacred’ notion of the 
welfare state, which the populist radical right politicians aimed to capitalise 
upon in their discourse (cf. e.g., Nordensvard & Ketola, 2014; Norocel, 2016; 
Pyrhönen, 2015). Nostalgic appeals to the ‘forsaken welfare state’, rather than 
to heroic victories of past national leaders (cf. Mols & Jetten, 2014), seem, 
despite the concept’s association with the political left, to constitute a central 
component of the discourse in Finnish, and especially in Swedish populist 
radical right political blogs.  
In the Swedish discourse the notion of the folkhem, the ultimate source of 
social welfare, bears a particularly strong connotation. Even though it was a 
central feature of the Finnish blogs as well, my analyses suggest that nostalgic 
appeals to the 19th century nation-building and to the endurance of the 
Finnish people in the wars against Russia were even more frequent here. In 
line with the findings of Nordensvard and Ketola (2014), these patterns seem 
to reflect Sweden’s long history and position as the prime example of social 
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democratic welfare, as compared with Finland’s relatively late adoption of this 
model. The Euroscepticism that Nordensvard and Ketola found in their study 
of the FP’s welfare discourse was not a predominant theme in the present 
study. This, however, is likely to be a reflection of the disparate materials used 
in their study (official party documents, including an EU-programme), 
compared with the present one that has focused on political blogs out of which 
many are explicitly anti-immigration. Together, these findings emphasize that 
if we wish to unpack such powerful discursive resources – rooted in socially 
recognized meanings and memories – we must approach (nationalist) political 
discourse as part and parcel of its specific social, political and historical 
context. 
This conclusion leads me to my second reason for choosing Finland and 
Sweden as the empirical context of this study: it allowed for a comparison 
between two countries that are culturally and politically very similar, yet in 
important aspects different from each other. The comparative approach was 
able to highlight the ways in which differences in immigration and asylum 
policies (Study I), in the developmental paths of the welfare state (Studies I 
and IV), in the societal emphases on gender equality and feminism (Study II), 
in the historical roots of the parties (Study I), and in the collective and 
nostalgic memories upon which nationalism is constructed (Studies I and IV) 
appear in the discourse of populist radical right politicians in the two 
countries. Study III lacked a comparative perspective for the simple and 
perhaps not all too surprising reason that I was not able to find any politicians 
within the FP that were of immigrant or other ethnic minority background and 
actively held a political blog. Rather than being a mere limitation of this study, 
however, this state of affairs also provides a reflection of the differences 
between the two countries and the implications of these differences for radical 
right politics: the SD, in struggling to wipe away their racist stain, and in acting 
in a country where the foreign-born population is considerably larger than in 
Finland, are both more devoted and able to attract members from this 
constituency. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned peculiarities of the Finnish-Swedish 
setting, the present study shows that nationalist, anti-immigration and radical 
right political discourse in the context of Finland and Sweden bears 
considerable similarity to that of radical right politicians in countries as 
diverse as Australia (e.g., Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Rapley, 1998), Austria 
(e.g., Wodak, 2011; Wodak & Richardson, 2013), France (e.g., Beauzamy, 
2013; Mols & Jetten, 2014; Van der Valk, 2003), Germany (Posch, Stopfner, & 
Kienpointner, 2013), Hungary (e.g., Kovács & Szilágyi, 2013), Italy (e.g., 
Volpato, Durante, Gabbiadini, Andrighetto, & Mari, 2010), the Netherlands 
(e.g., Rooyakers & Verkuyten, 2012; Van Dijk, 1992; Verkuyten, 2013), 
Portugal (e.g., Marinho & Billig, 2013), and the UK (e.g., Atton, 2006; Finlay, 
2007; Goodman & Johnson, 2014; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b; Richardson & 
Colombo, 2014; Wood & Finlay, 2008). As we have seen (RQ 2, Study I), the 
three discursive constructions of Otherness – a deviant group of people, a 
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threatening ideology and an inner enemy – are familiar from studies on radical 
right discourse in these other country-contexts. However, in studying a large 
set of material from two countries, and in analytically exploring contemporary 
nationalist political discourse of Otherness in an encompassing way rather 
than focusing on particular features of it (e.g., only on notions of cultural 
essentialism, appeals to nostalgia, or positioning as ‘ordinary people’), the 
present study is, I argue, able to give a uniquely broad view of the multifaceted 
character of this discourse. It also confirms – whether the parties wish to agree 
with this or not – that radical right discourse is in many ways transnational in 
nature. 
In exploring the yet understudied topic of the worldview of women within 
populist radical right parties, my study has been able to show that the position 
of women in these parties is indeed characterized by tension and ambivalence 
between norms of feminism and gender equality, on the one hand, and a 
patriarchal politics, on the other (RQ 3, Study II). Based upon my findings, 
however, the level of this tension within the politicians’ discourse seems very 
much to be a reflection of the degree to which surrounding societal norms of 
gender equality and feminism can compete with the populist radical right 
political ideology that is adversely disposed towards these very norms. Sweden 
can indeed, even more so than Finland, be considered an international 
forerunner in the promotion of gender equality and feminism. The ambivalent 
and nuanced Swedish versus the unanimously anti-feminist Finnish position 
seems to be a reflection of this: the SD women seemed ever conscious of the 
strong political norms of feminism that they have to negotiate their views 
against, whereas the FP did not (yet) have such feminist political pressures to 
tackle.  
I found a further tension within the discourse of populist radical right 
politicians that were balancing between, on the one hand, an ethnic minority 
membership and, on the other, a political membership that is hostile to ethnic 
minorities (RQ 4, Study III). The varying and situational ways in which ethnic 
identities can be constructed has been demonstrated in previous studies 
conducted through group discussions or interviews in which identities are 
openly negotiated and ‘offered’ to the participants by the researcher (Merino 
& Tileagă, 2011; Sala, Dandy & Rapley, 2010; Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002; 
Yamaguchi, 2005; cf. Potter & Hepburn, 2005). The fact that such variation 
occurred also in this study, within the individually written blog-entries by 
populist radical right politicians who were free to position themselves as they 
wished, sheds new light onto the malleable and flexible character of ethnic 
identities. As has been shown elsewhere (Verkuyten, 2005), arguments against 
affirmative action for and in favour of assimilation of ethnic minorities are not 
only presented by majority group members, but also, for an array of reasons, 
by ethnic minority group members themselves. The present study suggests 
that one such reason might be the context of transmitting a political message 
that refutes an ethnically diverse and multicultural society. Populist radical 
right politicians who also represent ethnic minority groups could, 
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alternatively, play the role of promoting the inclusion of various ethnic groups 
into a broader definition of national belonging (see Varjonen et al., 2013, for a 
study of the construction of a Finnish identity). My research findings indicate, 
however, that they have chosen a rather different path.  
It may be that the discourse of the SD-politicians with ethnic minority 
membership reflects the politicians’ membership in and identification with, 
not necessarily their ethnic ingroup, but their political one (cf. Reicher et al., 
2008). Nevertheless, my findings do confirm Reicher and Hopkins’ (2001b) 
argument that any constructions of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in political rhetoric 
depend on the strategic organisation of the speaker’s social – ethnic or other 
– identity constructions, and on the actions that these constructions aim to 
perform. Indeed, as discussed in section 5.2 above, the immigrants and ethnic 
minority members – as well as the women – whose discourse I studied went 
through extensive rhetorical work in their blogs in order to justify and defend 
their political decision to join a populist radical right party. Even though I am 
unable to say anything about these politicians’ ‘true’ inner motives and 
political convictions, this finding suggests that this is indeed an issue that they 
cannot lightly dismiss, but one that they need to acknowledge in their 
(political) discourse. Further, this study discloses that the women, immigrants 
and ethnic minority members who join radical right parties serve as living 
proof that these parties – counter to their reputation – are open to and are in 
fact pursuing a policy that is friendly towards women and ethnic minorities. 
In this sense, these politicians play a significant role in enhancing the public 
appeal and persuasive power of their parties’ politics. As Mitch Berbrier 
(2008) has concluded: ‘Ethnicity and race are cultural tools – things used as 
resources in social action’ (p. 586). The critical discursive analyses of the 
present study have been able to show that, in the case of populist radical right 
political discourse, ethnicity, race as well as gender can be used as resources 
that serve to further rather than counter gender and racial inequalities 
(Studies II and III).  
In this study I have argued for a multidisciplinary approach to studying 
populist radical right political blogs, one which combines analytical 
procedures from critical discursive, rhetorical and narrative psychology with 
tools for studying the visual and digital features of the blogs (RQ 5, Study IV). 
This approach has enabled an exploration and demonstration of how the 
particular features of these blogs may be efficiently exploited for purposes of 
voter persuasion and mobilisation. Within political blogs, messages that 
construct antagonistic identities between ‘us’, the true people and patriots of 
this nation, and ‘them’ the intruders and traitors to it, are shaped not merely 
through cunning rhetoric, but also through a conglomerate of narrative, digital 
and (audio-)visual elements that contribute to the force of the message. The 
rhetorical strategy of active voicing (Potter, 1996), that is, the provision of 
external information-sources or voices of others that serve to enhance the 
sense of factuality and credibility of a message, so common in radical right and 
racist discourse, can in blogs be deployed by subtle digital means, such as 
 79 
hyperlinking or presenting powerful imagery. This strategy of digital voicing 
is made possible by the unique character of Internet-based discourse: it does 
not, like ‘offline’ talk, disappear after it has been expressed, but remains stored 
and readily accessible for usage in future and to the original speaker perhaps 
unanticipated contexts (cf. Giles et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, thanks to the potential of the blog to constitute a space for 
blogger-reader interaction the speaker can remain silent on sensitive matters 
and instead rhetorically leave the readers with the task of making judgements. 
Through these means the speaker may express radical and even racist views 
without actually saying anything him- or herself. Given the potential of such 
messages to reach beyond the blogosphere and into the midst of the public 
debate (see section 3.3), the potential of political blogs for voter persuasion 
and mobilisation must not be underestimated. My study thus provides firm 
support for the idea that social psychological research needs to move beyond 
the mere study of text if it wishes to grasp the multifaceted nature of 
contemporary political communication and persuasion (Study IV). 
6.2 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
A board on which qualitative researchers in general, and discursive 
researchers in particular, must balance, relates to the challenges involved in 
selecting material in a way that, on the one hand, is sufficiently narrow to allow 
for thorough discursive analyses, and on the other, sufficiently broad to 
provide analytical insights into the topic of study. Each of the four separate 
sub-studies in this dissertation was limited since the material utilised in them 
was unable to cover all aspects of the topics of anti-immigration discourse 
(Study I), the worldview of women (Study II) or immigrants or ethnic minority 
members (Study III) within populist radical right parties, or the distinctive 
features of nationalist political blogs (Study IV). The bloggers vary greatly in 
terms of how actively they post entries in their blogs, some writing at least one 
(often short) entry per day, whilst others write lengthy essay-like entries more 
seldom. Moreover, as the role of intertextuality, that is, of quoting and 
referring to other blogs, often to those of influential politicians, is such a 
common feature within the political blogosphere, some voices tend to gain 
more power than others. In the Finnish context this is most prominent in the 
case of Jussi Halla-aho, whose writings reappear in anti-immigration blogs as 
well as online discussion-fora, and whose influence and status within the anti-
immigration community remains unmatched. It would not be fair to say that 
the material in this study reflects the individual bloggers’ views completely 
equally. Nevertheless, a valuable feature of the present research project is that 
it was possible for us to select the material ourselves, abiding from the outset 
by the strict criteria mentioned in sections 4.1.1-4.1.4 above that we set in order 
to answer the research questions. Thus, the final selection of material is all but 
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arbitrary: it is the result of thoroughgoing work and considerations of the 
research endeavours. 
The difficulty of finding adequate material at all was prominent in the case 
of Study III, where the research question itself caused challenges. The final set 
of material consisted of blogs of four politicians only two of whom had gone 
through an actual process of immigration themselves; where three out of four 
were women; and where no-one was a newcomer to Sweden (no-one had, for 
instance, arrived as a refugee or asylum-seeker in the 21st century). Thus, I 
cannot claim that the politicians whose discourse we examined reflect the view 
of the vast and heterogeneous group called ‘immigrants’ in everyday talk, nor 
that they represent the prototype of an ‘unwanted’ asylum-seeker that the SD 
wish to exclude from the nation. These are limiting and potentially distorting 
factors, which entail that the discourse examined in Study III is by no means 
representative of immigrants within the radical right in general. As we have 
seen, however, from a social psychological perspective all four politicians had 
an ethnic minority background that they oftentimes, and with no immediate 
provocation, did acknowledge in their identity constructions. As we have also 
seen, these constructions served important social and political functions, and 
are thus, I argue, nevertheless highly relevant concerns for critical social 
psychological researchers. 
Within the field of discursive research, co-authoring bears with it specific 
constraints as well as affordances. Most importantly, division of labour at the 
stage of analysing the material means that the authors are not equally familiar 
with all parts of the material.  Co-authoring also bears with it the risk of, on 
the one hand, the authors starting to converge too much in their 
interpretations, or, on the other, of disagreeing about them. Nevertheless, the 
studies presented here are a result of continuous and intense collaboration and 
discussion, in which we have critically examined and reflected  upon our own 
and each other’s interpretations, and thoroughly  familiarised ourselves with 
the entire material. I am convinced that this exchange of critical viewpoints 
and ideas throughout the research process has been a great enrichment to this 
study. 
The critical discursive and rhetorical psychological approach adopted in 
this study also bears with it constraints as well as affordances. First, I do not 
and cannot based on qualitative in-depth analysis of a limited set of material 
make claims of any broader generalisability of the discursive patterns I 
studied. Neither do I, given the constructionist and discursive psychological 
perspective I have adopted, assume that the discourse I studied is a reflection 
of the individual politicians ‘true’ attitudes, motives and goals, nor of any ‘real’ 
world that exists ‘out there’. This is not to say that a more realist perspective 
would have been an inadequate way of approaching the present topic – it 
would simply have been a different one, with different goals. Rather than 
striving to generalise the results, to explore the inner cognitive world of the 
politicians, or to make claims about the degree of truthfulness of their 
arguments, this study has critically explored the discursive and rhetorical 
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patterns in depth (e.g., Weltman & Billig, 2001) and approached them as both 
functions and constructors of their surrounding societal, political and 
historical contexts (e.g., Edley, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a).  
Recognising that the discourse I studied is not representative of nationalist 
discourse at large does not, however, mean that some of its implications 
cannot be (Goodman, 2008). As we have seen, the construction of discursive 
boundaries between ‘us’ who belong to the nation and ‘they’ who do not, 
typically through cultural essentialist arguments and a concomitant denial of 
racism, is a rhetorical strategy used by radical right politicians for exclusionary 
nationalist purposes across temporal and geographical contexts. Indeed, as 
Simon Goodman (2008) notes, it may be that discursive psychologists could 
and should begin to talk about the potential of their findings to have a certain 
kind of generalisability: in so far as discourse is constituted of systems of 
meaning (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987) that may persist across time and 
space, and in so far as it is seen as action-oriented (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992), 
the goals that certain systems of meaning aim to – and often do – accomplish 
may indeed have a general character. This suggestion, in turn, can serve as an 
encouragement for critics of exclusionary nationalist discourse that seek to 
promote a discourse whose goals are the opposite. It also opens up the 
prospect of moving away from the traditional quantitative-generalizable and 
qualitative-non-generalizable dichotomy, and towards talking about different 
sorts of generalisability instead. 
My choices in terms of methodology and analytical procedures engender 
further thoroughgoing reflections and concerns. In Study IV the main 
analytical approaches of critical discursive and rhetorical psychology were 
accompanied by analytical procedures from social semiotic and rhetorical 
studies of images. Within this field, the cognitive aspects of visual 
communication are not necessarily disregarded or discarded; rather, 
researchers may be interested in, for example, the cognitive resources we use 
in the construction and interpretation of visual images (Jewitt & Oyama, 
2001), and in the ways that visual communication may affect viewers’ attitudes 
and emotions (Blair, 2004). Yet, despite these theoretical disparities, I argue 
that since the different approaches share an emphasis on how meanings are 
constructed in verbal, visual and digital discourse, and on what functions such 
constructions can have, it is both possible and commendable to unite them in 
a critical study of political (blog) discourse (cf. Edley, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 
2001). 
I was from the outset attracted by the approaches of critical discursive and 
rhetorical psychology in terms of their emphasis on the socially embedded and 
functional character as well as the argumentative and dilemmatic nature of 
discourse – foci that I found especially important for purposefully studying the 
character and functions of nationalist political discourse. Alternative ways of 
approaching the topic of political discourse would have been to do so from a 
discourse historical (e.g., Reisigl & Wodak, 2015) or critical discourse 
analytical perspective, as for example that advocated by Norman and Isabela 
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Fairclough (e.g., Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), as discussed in section 3.4 
above. These perspectives do in my view share central emphases with critical 
discursive psychology: all acknowledge the socially constructed and 
historically situated character of discourse, and pay attention to its rhetorical 
organisation. Indeed, in conducting this study, I repeatedly found myself 
struggling to disseminate the precise epistemological differences between the 
perspectives, and to fathom the reasons for the shortage of communication 
between their adherents. A critical discursive psychological exploration of the 
way that the speaking subject discursively positions him- or herself in relation 
to others (e.g., Edley, 2001) is, I argue, very much akin to the way that a 
narrative researcher may disseminate the hero and the villain of a story 
(Propp, 1968; cf. e.g., László, Ehmann, Péley & Pólya, 2002), how the 
rhetorical psychologist explores speakers’ arguments and counter-arguments 
(e.g., Billig, 1987), or how the critical discourse analyst investigates the use of 
claims and counter-claims in political rhetoric (e.g., Fairclough & Fairclough, 
2012). Thus, despite the advantages of different discourse analytical 
disciplines maintaining their own specific affordances, I share Martha 
Augoustinos’ (2013) concern about the disadvantages of building too strict 
boundaries between them.18 It seems to me that adherents of all the separate 
domains, given their substantial overlap in terms of research interests and 
epistemological stances, could benefit rather than lose from intensified 
discussion and exchange. This could, ultimately, significantly enrich critical 
social scientific research into political communication and persuasion. 
6.3 ETHICAL CONCERNS 
In this study I have scrutinized the blog-writings of individual politicians and 
made explicit their names. Similar to Facebook users who do not necessarily 
share researchers’ views on what constitutes ‘public’ versus ‘private’ 
communication (cf. Gleibs, 2014), it is most probable that the bloggers have 
not written their accounts with the intention of providing material for critical 
academic research. An ethical question I have therefore been grappling with is 
whether or not to contact the politicians in advance in order to ask for their 
consent to study their writings. I did, however, choose not to do so. This is 
because my material derives from the politicians’ official political blogs that 
anyone may access and use for any purpose they like; and because the bloggers 
are influential politicians – not vulnerable groups who I run the risk of 
harming with my research (cf. Association of Internet Researchers, 2012).  
Also the methodological concerns discussed in section 6.2 above bear with 
them ethical ones. When conducting critical discursive research it is the 
                                                 
18 Similar concerns have been expressed by Margaret Wetherell, who in her 1998 study develops an 
analytical approach that integrates fine-grained, conversation analytical and post-structuralist, more 
genealogical perspectives on discourse. 
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researcher’s duty to remain critical of him- or herself as well. In my case this 
has entailed reflecting upon my own subjectivity in relation to the topic I study. 
As a Finnish woman, holding a university degree and belonging to the 
Swedish-speaking minority in Finland that the FP remains hostile towards 
(Jungar & Jupskås, 2014), these personal experiences and beliefs provide that 
I am no neutral observer of the topic of nationalist political discourse. My own 
ideological dilemma during this research journey has involved maintaining a 
critical analytical approach, yet continuously and determinedly avoiding to 
succumb to contemptuous judgement and bias of the discourse I study. At the 
end of all things I am, nevertheless, unable to remove my own subjectivity and 
the ways that it influences my research. This means that my interpretation of 
the discourse I have studied is only one possibility – it is my construction of 
others’ constructions. Yet, through constant self-reflection; by rigorously 
adhering to the analytical procedures of the research perspectives that I have 
applied; and by disclosing these analytical steps in detail, I have strived 
towards maximal transparency of my research. Moreover, the collaboration 
and discussions with my co-authors mentioned in section 6.2 above, as well as 
the valuable comments I have received from social psychologists and other 
social and political scientists, increase my confidence about the results of this 
study. It is my hope, therefore, that my interpretation remains useful rather 
than arbitrary – for social psychological research and in terms of societal 
relevance as well. 
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The present study’s focus on political blogs has spawned multiple queries to 
be further explored in future research. As I have sought to emphasize, a central 
feature in terms of the social psychological dynamics involved in political 
blogging is its communicative and collaborative nature (Baumer et al., 2011; 
cf. chapters 3.3 and 5.3): oftentimes the readers are able to directly comment 
upon the politician’s blog-entry, and engage in a discussion with him or her as 
well as amongst each other. Exactly how such discussion-threads evolve, for 
instance, how consistency and variability (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) occur in 
this discourse, and how the discussion unfolds in terms of topics and turn-
taking (e.g., Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007) would be challenging yet fascinating 
topics for discursive psychologists and conversation analysts to explore (cf. 
Giles et al., 2015). 
This leads me to a further related reflection. An actor that is central for the 
construction and re(production) of an exclusionary nation and that, in 
Goffman’s (1981) terms, is neither physically present nor imagined, is the 
audience. Even though I have sought to elaborate on how the bloggers engage 
in discursive and rhetorical work in order to increase the attraction and 
credibility of their messages, my analyses are unable to determine the extent 
to which they have been successful or not in their endeavour to appeal to their 
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readerships. Future studies might indeed investigate this issue, for example by 
analysing discussion-threads that blog-entries engender in online fora, or by 
studying the afore-mentioned comment-sections in the blogs themselves. For 
the present moment, my conclusions about the rhetorical force of the blog-
discourse, our awareness of its reincarnation in other media (e.g., Farrell & 
Drezner, 2008), and its irreplaceable role in explaining the triumphal march 
of the populist radical right in Finland and Sweden (e.g., Horsti, 2015), must 
suffice as indications of its success in this regard. 
Moving forward, the present study has necessarily been limited in its 
empirical focus on the blog-writings of Finnish and Swedish populist radical 
right politicians. Indeed, Europe has witnessed not only a new wave of radical 
right-wing populist parties, but also of left-wing populists who have gained 
electoral fortunes in countries such as Spain and Greece. An interesting 
avenue for future research would be to compare the discourse of the populist 
right with the populist left. How might these oppositional parties, in terms of 
positioning on the political spectrum, differ from or resemble each other in the 
ways that they use, for example, appeals to socially recognized and nostalgic 
memories in their discourse? 
On the other hand, it would have been interesting indeed to include also 
the two Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Norway in this study, as these 
countries as well have witnessed the rise of populist radical right parties in the 
21st century. It would be fascinating to compare, for example, how the 
discourse of the four Nordic populist radical right parties might vary as a 
function of whether or not they are (as in Finland and Norway) or are not (as 
in Sweden and Denmark) in government position, that is, whether or not they 
are forced to balance between their populist anti-elite mission on the one 
hand, and their own position within that very elite, on the other. This must 
remain a task for future research, however, since my knowledge of Danish and 
Norwegian is limited, and as it would have been beyond the scope of this 
doctoral research project to conduct thorough discursive analyses on as broad 
a data-corpus as such an endeavour would have required. 
I set out on this study in the beginning of 2014, when neither the SD nor 
the FP were in government position, and when the ‘refugee crisis’ was yet to 
come. At this time, these two parties were the loudest proclaimers of 
exclusionary nationalist policies in their respective countries. Since then, 
however, it seems that the so-called established parties in both countries have 
– be it for reasons of political conviction or strategy – began to follow suit. May 
the following examples serve as brief illustrations of this development. In early 
2016 the Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister described his 
government’s turn towards a harsher asylum policy in 2015 as a reaction to the 
former ‘disastrous’ policy of the EU and the conservative parties who sought 
to ‘erode the Swedish welfare model’ (Magnusson, 2016). His Finnish 
colleague, in turn, dismissed accusations that his government’s asylum policy 
breached constitutional and human rights law with statements that the policy 
is ‘working just fine’ (Junkkari, 2016), and that it is warranted by the fact that 
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it is in line with that of Sweden (Lydén, 2016). Let us note that this was not an 
argument the Finnish Prime Minister put forward in the time when Sweden’s 
asylum policy was liberal.  
We can also extend our examples beyond the Nordic context and look at 
France, where the presidential elections of 2017 were assumed to become a 
combat between the radical right Marine Le Pen and the conservative ex-
president Nicolas Sarkozy. In September 2016, the latter candidate, desperate 
to gain the trust of the anti-immigration voters of the former, declared on 
Twitter: ‘In France, there is only one community: the French community that 
consists of one language, one culture and one way of life’ (Sarkozy, 2016). 
These examples illuminate that it is certainly necessary not to assume that 
populism and exclusionary nationalism are phenomena confined to the radical 
right. As discussed in chapter 2.1, populism is not something that one is, but 
something that one does. How it is done in the discourse of parties across the 
political spectrum, including amongst those in the very highest positions of 
power, and what potentially detrimental societal implications this discourse 
can have, is an urgent topic for social and political psychological research. 
6.5 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This study has shown how exclusionary and gendered nationalist political 
appeals can be conveyed through political blogs in ways that allow the 
individual politicians to appear as non-prejudiced, liberal and as acting on 
behalf of ‘the people’. It has shown that the way these appeals are constructed 
are reflections of the ‘digital age’ in which they are embedded: politicians 
efficiently use social media along with their digital affordances for the sake of 
convincing potential voters of their own political aims. Yet, as this and other 
critical discourse studies have shown (e.g., Beauzamy, 2013; Musolff, 2011; 
Richardson, 2013; Wodak, 2009) racist views also remain couched in 
rhetorical formulations and metaphors that have a long history in racist 
speech. This entails a double challenge for those who wish to unpack and 
remain critical of nationalist and racist policies in the 21st century. On the one 
hand, we must be wary of the ‘new’ digital and audio-visual elements in which 
these policies are concealed and through which they are transmitted. On the 
other hand, however, it would be detrimental to believe that we have ‘learned 
from the past’ and could today lightly see through political rhetoric such as 
that of the Nazis in the 20th century. This is something to be especially aware 
of in contemporary Europe that has shown its weakness in terms of withering 
inter-state solidarity – not least in managing the large influx of asylum-seekers 
in 2015 – but that still has a chance to hinder radical right and nationalist 
movements to dictate who is and who is not entitled to a life of dignity and 
human rights. 
A troubling contemporary trend seems to be that the long-lasting and 
powerful taboos against prejudice are partially and slowly, yet certainly, being 
Discussion 
86 
replaced with taboos against accusations of prejudice and racism (cf. 
Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Goodman, 2008). There is a danger here that the 
definition of racism grows so narrow that no (discursive or non-discursive) act 
fits into it. Concomitantly, online discussion fora – including commentaries in 
political blogs – flourish with anonymous articulations of hate. In order to 
counter this problem, that is, in order to be able to adequately intervene in 
racism and hate-speech, decision-makers must ensure that the monitoring of 
and legislation concerning the online space is continuously developed. As 
users and consumers of online media, we should all do our utmost to maintain 
a border between freedom of speech and hate-speech also in this public sphere, 
and to identify occurrences of the latter in rhetorical disguise of the former.  
A central outcome of this study is indeed that critical reading of political 
discourse should not remain the interest of social and political scientists alone. 
As contemporary political discourse is rapidly transmitted and circulated 
through a multitude of media channels – new and traditional – it is a challenge 
for any reader to disseminate where what seem to be ‘facts’ actually derive 
from; what is being simplified in the discourse; and what is being left unsaid. 
Journalists are in a crucial position in terms of how they collect, critically 
interpret and quote the information they acquire from, for example, political 
blogs. A newly coined website of the French newspaper Libération provides an 
excellent example of such an initiative: it aims to scrutinize extreme 
propaganda, from left to right, and to provide counter-arguments and 
statistical evidence that refutes false claims (Tollgerdt, 2016).  
Finally, young people are active users of the Internet and social media, and 
therefore it is of utmost importance that they learn to critically evaluate the 
sources from which they acquire information and in which they are offered 
attractive and seemingly solid political arguments. Schools, universities and 
other educational contexts provide a key and fruitful forum for developing 
critical reading at a young age. 
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This doctoral dissertation has aimed to demonstrate the rhetorically powerful 
and in many aspects peculiar character of exclusionary and gendered forms of 
nationalist discourse contained in political blogs. It has done so by combining 
critical discursive and rhetorical psychological as well as narrative studies of 
text with analyses of the digital and (audio-)visual elements that make the 
messages contained in political blogs unique in their content and form. The 
findings indicate that nationalist political blogging can function efficiently to 
(re)produce gender and racial inequalities, and to persuade presumptive 
supporters of political aims that do so. Thanks to the particular features that 
blogs provide this can be done without the individual politician having to 
express personal views that render him or her liable to accusations of 
misogyny, prejudice or racism. In light of these findings, the present study 
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confirms that we must be cautious in our view of social media, including the 
blogosphere, as purely beneficial to democratic causes (cf. Loader & Mercea, 
2011). 
The bloggers who have been the focus of this study are politicians with 
significant authority: the discourse they engage in in their blogs continues to 
circulate in and influence the broader public debates. That is, through their 
discourse, these politicians exert substantial power in determining who does 
and who does not belong in a society. This dissertation has demonstrated that 
even though it may claim to aim for the opposite, such discourse can function 
to foment radicalisation, societal tensions and instability, and to create an 
atmosphere where extreme groups feel encouraged and empowered. This 
holds true not only for the two countries studied here, but indeed for all of 
Europe, where nationalism is showing its face in a way we have not witnessed 
since 1945. The challenge to the media, politicians and civil activists alike 
remains in not endorsing and adapting a rhetoric that provides empty 
promises and seemingly simple solutions to complex issues; that promotes an 
exclusionary idea of the nation; and that necessitates an antagonistic division 
between ‘us, the worthy’ and ‘them, the less worthy’. Instead, if we are to 
maintain a Europe of solidarity and diversity we must provide convincing and 
sustainable alternatives to this rhetoric. Critically unpacking the arguments it 
rests on may give us something to embark from on our way towards this goal. 
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